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ABSTRACT 
This thesis presents an unconventional approach to addressing a threat to 
homeland security by focusing on complacency through the lens of human 
factors and complexity. This approach requires a paradigm shift. In addition to 
focusing on external threats from enemies who wish to do this nation harm, and 
building capabilities to prepare for disasters, it is also necessary to look internally 
to the behaviors, attitudes, and states of mind of people within homeland security 
organizations to optimize the success of this country’s efforts. 
This thesis draws from human factors science, folk science and folk 
psychology, complexity theory, homeland security doctrine, psychology and 
biology reference works, and applied research to develop a concept of 
complacency for the homeland security discipline. The hypothesis is that a clear 
definition may lead to actionable, observable measures to mitigate it. The 
research concludes that complacency is more commonly used as a proverbial 
threat than an actionable threat, but reveals a plethora of future research 
opportunities for a human-factors approach to addressing threats of this nature. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
In the world of homeland security, it is common practice that as threats are 
identified, counter-measures are developed to mitigate that threat. One threat 
often mentioned, complacency, seems to be the exception. Complacency, as a 
threat to homeland security, is given ample deference by leadership in the 
homeland security community. It is often referred to as a dangerous threat in 
speeches by homeland security officials and is embedded in homeland security 
doctrine. However, no research can be currently found that articulates the threat 
in a manner that can lead to developing counter-measures to mitigate it.  
A. INTRODUCTION 
As threats to the homeland evolve, it is imperative that new ways of 
analyzing and assessing potential threats evolve as well. The 2010 Quadrennial 
Homeland Security Review (QHSR) states, “Achieving the goals of the core 
homeland security missions will require scientific research to discover new 
knowledge and methods that can be applied to homeland security challenges.” 
(Department of Homeland Security, 2010, p. 75). This statement provides the 
opening for exploring innovative and unconventional ways to enhance the 
resiliency of the homeland security enterprise that this thesis offers. 
This thesis presents an unconventional, human factors approach by 
addressing complacency. A human factors approach focuses on psychology and 
behavior that will decrease the potential negative consequences of complacency. 
This approach requires a paradigm shift. In addition to focusing on external 
threats from enemies that wish to do this nation harm, and building capabilities to 
prepare for disasters, it is also necessary to look internally to the behaviors, 
attitudes, and states of mind of people within homeland security organizations to 




B FRAMING THE PROBLEM 
Tacitly, much research is driven by practical, readily accessible problems. 
People are attentive to concerns about decision making and policy direction and 
inattentive to implicit, deep rooted problems like complacency. However, dealing 
with consequences that result may from complacency can be much more costly 
than the value of lessons learned from them. Therefore, it is necessary to 
research, analyze, and draw conclusions as to what the concept of complacency 
is, as with other threats to homeland security. 
Complacency is a general term commonly used by homeland security 
professionals to describe an attitude or human behavior that is an insidious threat 
to the homeland security mission. In an address to the Council on Foreign 
Relations, Janet Napolitano, Secretary for the United States (U.S.) Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) stated, “I’m often asked if complacency is a threat in 
the United States and I believe the short answer is ‘yes’” (Napolitano, 2009). 
During remarks to the National Cargo Security Council, James Loy, former 
Deputy Secretary of DHS stated, “Complacency is the ally of the terrorist” (Loy, 
2004). These statements elucidate complacency as a subjective and 
unconventional threat that warrants further understanding. However, specific 
measures to understand and address it are lacking. 
The concept of complacency, much like many general concepts that 
describe complex human behavior, has developed and evolved over time 
through folk science, or more specifically, folk psychology. Folk science 
describes a way that people understand and predict the natural and social world, 
without the use of scrupulous, scientific methodologies. Based on this author’s 
research, complacency in homeland security has not undergone rigorous inquiry.  
Complacency is easy, prima facie, to understand; its subjectivity evokes 
an intuitive understanding of what it means. However, the intuitive evocation is 
part of the reason complacency continues to be unaddressed. The usage of 
over-generalized terms that describe complex human behavior precludes further 
 xiv 
investigation into the psychological mechanisms that may actually be responsible 
for the observed behavior (Dekker & Hollnagel, 2004). 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
What, exactly, is complacency? What causes homeland security 
practitioners, such as preparedness planners and intelligence analysts, to be less 
vigilant as they conduct their jobs on a routine basis? Is complacency really a 
threat to homeland security? If it is, can anything be done about it? 
D. PRACTICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
The purpose of this research is to gain a comprehensive understanding of 
what complacency really means in the homeland security discipline, determine its 
credibility as a threat, and provide a foundation from which to address it. The 
consumers of this research will be homeland security leadership open to 
unconventional approaches in support of the homeland security mission and 
identify complacency as a problem.  
E. CONCLUSIONS 
The author originally set out to apply basic problem-solving strategies to 
address a threat to homeland security, Complacency, through the lens of human 
factors and complexity. Her research concludes that the general manner in which 
complacency is commonly used today indicates it is more of a proverbial threat 
than an actionable threat. As a proverbial threat, it can be argued that it should 
not be mentioned at all. However, defining the concept into actionable, 
observable behavior may lead to actionable, observable measures to mitigate it.  
This thesis was the first research to examine the threat critically. The 
research uncovered a broader range of lenses from which to view complacency 
in the homeland security enterprise. Each lens further unveiled limitless, albeit 
tangential, opportunities for research in a wide variety of disciplines. The lenses 
range the spectrum from philosophy, biological sciences, social sciences, and 
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applied sciences. This broad range allowed the surface to be scratched in each 
area, and further revealed extensive opportunity for future research.  
Critical examination of the threat of complacency is in its infancy stages. 
Future research can be explored through the many lenses identified in this 
thesis. It is uncertain whether future research will find that complacency is a 
threat, is not a threat, or result in a definition, or definitions, that articulate the 
threat, and counter-measures are developed to mitigate it. However, it is certain 
that it will lead to more lenses from which it can be viewed. 
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I. AN UNCONVENTIONAL APPROACH 
Complacency is the greatest enemy that we have and the greatest 
challenge we have. 
—Michael C. Chertoff, Former Secretary, 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
 
As threats to the homeland evolve, it is imperative that new ways of 
analyzing and assessing potential threats evolve as well. The 2010 Quadrennial 
Homeland Security Review (QHSR) states, “Achieving the goals of the core 
homeland security missions will require scientific research to discover new 
knowledge and methods that can be applied to homeland security challenges…” 
(Department of Homeland Security, 2010, p. 75). This statement provides the 
opening for exploring innovative and unconventional ways to enhance the 
resiliency of the homeland security enterprise that this thesis offers. 
This thesis presents an unconventional, human factors approach by 
addressing complacency. A human factors approach focuses on psychology and 
behavior that will decrease the potential negative consequences of complacency. 
This approach requires a paradigm shift. In addition to focusing on external 
threats from enemies that wish to do this nation harm, and building capabilities to 
prepare for disasters, it is also necessary to look internally to the behaviors, 
attitudes, and states of mind of people within homeland security organizations to 
optimize the success of this country’s efforts.  
Human factors are physical, cognitive, or social properties that affect the 
attitude, state of mind, and behavior of humans. These properties can influence 
the function of human-environment equilibriums and the overall performance of 
systems and organizations. Human factors science involves the study of all ways 
humans relate to the world around them, with the aim of improving operational 
performance. This science has become widely used across many disciplines 
since its origin during World War II when the military employed it in designing 
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aircrafts, by viewing the aircraft and the pilot as a single organism. While the 
initial focus of human factors science was on human interaction with technology, 
the science has expanded to encompass sets of human-specific properties that 
may interact in a critical or dangerous manner with the natural environment and 
within organizations.  
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II. INTRODUCTION 
A. FRAMING THE PROBLEM 
Tacitly, much research is driven by practical, readily accessible problems. 
People are attentive to concerns about decision making and policy direction and 
inattentive to implicit, deep rooted problems like complacency. However, dealing 
with consequences that result may from complacency can be much more costly 
than the value of lessons learned from them. Therefore, it is necessary to 
research, analyze, and draw conclusions as to what the concept of complacency 
is, as with other threats to homeland security. 
Complacency is a general term commonly used by homeland security 
professionals to describe an attitude or human behavior that is an insidious threat 
to the homeland security mission. In an address to the Council on Foreign 
Relations, Janet Napolitano, Secretary for the United States (U.S.) Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) stated, “I’m often asked if complacency is a threat in 
the United States and I believe the short answer is ‘yes’” (Napolitano, 2009). 
During remarks to the National Cargo Security Council, James Loy, former 
Deputy Secretary of DHS stated, “Complacency is the ally of the terrorist” (Loy, 
2004). These statements elucidate complacency as a subjective and 
unconventional threat that warrants further understanding. However, specific 
measures to understand and address it are lacking. 
The concept of complacency, much like many general concepts that 
describe complex human behavior, has developed and evolved over time 
through folk science, or more specifically, folk psychology. Folk science 
describes a way that people understand and predict the natural and social world, 
without the use of scrupulous, scientific methodologies. Based on this author’s 
research, complacency in homeland security has not undergone rigorous inquiry.  
Complacency is easy, prima facie, to understand; its subjectivity evokes 
an intuitive understanding of what it means. However, the intuitive evocation is 
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part of the reason complacency continues to be unaddressed. The usage of 
over-generalized terms that describe complex human behavior precludes further 
investigation into the psychological mechanisms that may actually be responsible 
for the observed behavior (Dekker & Hollnagel, 2004). 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. What Is Complacency for the Homeland Security Discipline?  
What, exactly, is complacency? What causes homeland security 
practitioners, such as preparedness planners and intelligence analysts, to be less 
vigilant as they conduct their jobs on a routine basis? The initial course of action 
to respond to this question would be to consult scholarly dictionaries for a 
seemingly authoritative answer. Dictionaries define it as being, “The fact or state 
of being pleased with a thing or person; tranquil pleasure or satisfaction in 
something or someone; The fact or state of being pleased with oneself; Tranquil 
pleasure or satisfaction in one’s own condition or doings; Self-satisfaction; 
Contented acquiescence or consent; Disposition or wish to please, or comply 
with the wishes of, others” (Oxford English Dictionary, 2010) or, ““self-satisfaction 
especially when accompanied by unawareness of actual dangers or deficiencies; 
or an instance of usually unaware or uninformed self-satisfaction” (Webster 
Online Dictionary, 2011). 
A psychologist might respond that complacency is, “A conscious or 
unconscious relaxation of one’s usual standards in making decisions and taking 
action” caused by “the subconscious or emotional mind (child ego state),…while 
it should be the conscious mind/rational mind (adult ego state) who is in control 
to find the cracks” (Grey Owl Aviation Consultants, 2004). A philosopher might 
respond that complacency “is the foundation of human behavior where the 
tendency of all living organisms is to seek a state of equilibrium” (Raup, 1925, p. 
193). 
Which is the right answer? Do they all apply to homeland security, partly 
apply, or mostly apply? These varying definitions and different perspectives 
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foreshadow the difficulty in developing an informed understanding of what it 
means for homeland security, but the implications of harm or failure associated 
with its use prompts further inquiry. 
2. Is Complacency a Threat to Homeland Security?  
Homeland security professionals commonly use the term complacency in 
a manner such that its presence is threatening to the homeland security mission. 
As cited earlier, Secretary Napolitano pointedly stated that it is a threat, and 
former Deputy Secretary Loy stated that it is an “ally of the terrorists” (Napolitano, 
2009; Loy, 2004). Additionally, the QHSR lists nine assumptions about the 
nation’s security environment that influenced the strategic framework to support 
the homeland security mission. One of the assumptions states, “[W]e must guard 
against the danger of complacency as memories of the 9/11 attacks and other 
major crises recede” (Department of Homeland Security, 2010, p. 19). 
The National Strategy for Homeland Security (NSHS) that preceded the 
QHSR also referred to complacency. 
We must guard against complacency and balance the sense of 
optimism that is fundamental to the American character with the 
sober recognition that despite our best efforts, future catastrophes 
—natural and man-made—will occur, and thus we must always 
remain a prepared Nation. (The White House, 2007, p. 3) 
In this case, it is addressed in more depth, but it is not defined, nor is it 
demonstrated how preparedness will balance the “sense of optimism” with the 
“sober recognition” that future catastrophes will occur.  
By the context in which it is commonly used, the conclusion that 
complacency is a threat to homeland security seems to be “yes.” However, the 
attribution to a blanket term, “complacency,” ignores the context, and thus, defies 
a concrete analysis of the threat. Until a comprehensive understanding of what it 
is in homeland security exists, it is difficult to ascertain its credibility. 
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3. What, If Anything, Can We Do About It? 
To move beyond the blanket attribution to complacency and determine if 
anything can be done about it, it is essential to first gain an informed 
understanding of what complacency is. This understanding can be accomplished 
by conducting a thorough analysis of how it is used in context, deconstruct it into 
key components, explore the human-specific properties and other factors that 
affect it, conduct an analytical review of how other complex organizations have 
dealt with it, and tie it all back together to develop a succinct definition. The 
comprehensive result should provide insight into its factors that can be 
manipulated in a manner that will prevent complacency, and thus, provide a 
foundation from which to address it.  
C. PRACTICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
The purpose of this research is to gain a comprehensive understanding of 
what complacency really means in the homeland security discipline, determine its 
credibility as a threat, and provide a foundation from which to address it. The 
consumers of this research will be homeland security leadership open to 
unconventional approaches in support of the homeland security mission and 
identify complacency as a problem. Options for future research include applying 
the informed understanding to specific levels of government, disciplines, and 
organizational structures of the homeland security enterprise and developing 
countermeasures to prevent it. 
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III. METHODOLOGY 
The research problems are one of exploring a behavioral attribute of 
humans that comprise the homeland security enterprise, which is considered 
threatening to the success of the homeland security mission. Complacency is a 
blanket term blamed for failures, and homeland security leadership and 
professionals are constantly warning against without a succinct definition for its 
application to homeland security.  
The author explores complacency without presupposition as to its 
meaning and researches it from a variety of different perspectives, thoroughly 
investigating its factors and implications. This review includes eliciting the 
deference it is given in official homeland security doctrine, inferring its factors by 
the manner in which it is used in context, and delving into the identified factors to 
see if something can be done to counteract it. 
The author employs pure research (PR), qualitative analysis (QA), content 
analysis (CA) and applied research (AR) for this thesis. First, it is necessary to 
understand how the threat of complacency has been valued in building the 
homeland security mission. PR is employed to review documents, such as the 
QHSR and the NSHS to gain insight to the degree to which it is addressed to 
provide a baseline understanding of what credence the threat is currently given. 
Additionally, QA and CA is used to review editorials in scholarly journals, and 
opinion pieces, interviews or remarks made by homeland security professionals 
to gain insight of the degree to which it is used to describe a threat to homeland 
security. Sources for this QA and CA are the top search results from Google 
including scholarly journals, weblogs, editorials, and news publications since 
September 2001, when the concept of homeland security was first introduced. 
Second, to develop a concept of complacency for the homeland security 
discipline the author reviews technical definitions and the way they are used in 
context. PR is used to review technical definitions in authoritative publications, 
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such as the English Oxford Dictionary. Additionally, QA and CA is applied to 
understand how it is used in context to infer underlying factors (e.g., temporal 
factor—if it is implied that complacency increases as time lapses since a 
successful attack). Sources for this QA and CA are the top search results from 
Google including scholarly journals, weblogs, editorials, and news publications 
since September 2001.  
Third, after inferring factors that comprise the concept, the author uses PR 
to explore them individually (i.e., psychological, environmental, situational). She 
reviews scholarly sources that have been published in various fields of study to 
review each factor to provide a deconstructed view to determine which, and 
maybe how, each factor can be influenced to thwart complacency.  
Finally, AR is used to review how the aviation industry has dealt with 
complacency. The aviation industry has explored complacency and its affects 
over the past few decades; it has enhanced some training programs, 
management development and changed organization constructs specifically to 
counter it. The author researches the knowledge that the aviation industry has 
produced and shared in a variety of scholarly works. This research may provide 
applicable insight to addressing complacency in homeland security. 
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IV. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The literature review for this thesis covers a broad range of material 
because it explores complexity theory, social science, and biological science. 
Additionally, it is important to introduce abstract notions that provide a 
background for this unconventional approach, such as human factors science 
and folk science. The review of literature is provided in the following categories.  
Human Factors Science: To explain the approach to this thesis, this 
section provides a history of human factors science and the reasons this field of 
study originated. Furthermore, this section also provides insight on the status of 
its credibility and applicability in other industries, such as homeland security.  
Folk Science and Folk Psychology: Literature on folk science and folk 
psychology is explored to provide a basic understanding of how general terms 
used to describe complex human behavior, such as complacency, have 
developed and become accepted within cultures. Specifically, for the purpose of 
this thesis, folk psychology theory will be closely reviewed because it pertains to 
how people refer to the “psychology of the mind,” which applies to complacency. 
This section also provides insight into the controversy regarding its credibility in 
describing mental state terms.  
Complexity Theory: The literature reviewed in this section explores 
complexity theory because it provides an understanding of the complex nature of 
the homeland security enterprise. It is within this complex environment that 
complacency manifests and can be perceived as problematic. This section also 
provides a review of literature about how complexity theory has been applied to 
organizations and management within such organizations.  
High Reliability Organizations and Reliability-Oriented Behaviors: This 
section reviews literature about complex high-reliability organizations (HRO) and 
reliability-oriented behaviors (REOO). HROs are complex systems that rely on 
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the people that comprise them and certain behaviors that employees should 
exhibit for the organization to be successful, which is applicable in every sense to 
the homeland security enterprise.  
Homeland Security Doctrine: Homeland security doctrine provides a 
strategic framework for implementing the homeland security mission. A review of 
this literature is provided to understand how complacency is addressed at an 
overarching, official level that steers the activities of the enterprise. Furthermore, 
conclusions can be drawn from the deference it is given as a potential threat, and 
the context in which it is used can provide insight into its various perceived 
factors.  
Definitions of Complacency: Scholarly references are consulted to 
understand what the technical definitions of complacency are in seemingly 
authoritative publications. The review of this literature aids in future analysis of 
the definitions to determine if they are adequate and applicable to the homeland 
security discipline. Assuming some are applicable, they also provide insight into 
factors that can affect, or contribute, to complacency. 
Complacency in Context: This section reviews a plethora of examples of 
how complacency is used in reference to homeland security. The contextual 
inferences provide insight as to what it implies and factors that contribute to it.  
Psychological and Biological Factors: This section explores the science of 
psychology to determine what psychological factors may contribute to what is 
commonly accepted as complacency. The psychological factors are gleaned 
from the definitions and the inferences when used in context. This section also 
explores potential biological predispositions towards complacency based on the 
psychological factors identified in the contextual review. This review aids in 
determining if biological factors support or reject natural tendencies towards 
complacency. 
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Situational and Environmental Factors: This section explores the 
situational and environmental factors of complacency implied in the contextual 
review. These factors include time, organizational construct, and management.  
Research in Aviation Complacency: This section provides an in-depth 
review of literature from the aviation industry, which has comparable attributes to 
the homeland security enterprise. The aviation industry has conducted extensive 
research on human factors (specifically complacency) and applied the knowledge 
to training regimens and organizational constructs to improve operational 
performance. 
B. HUMAN FACTORS SCIENCE 
A plethora of literature provides definitions for, classifications of, and 
approaches for addressing human factors. This literature is in the form of 
scholarly books, journals and articles. Due to the wide range of disciplines that 
research human factors, the literature is from diverse backgrounds including 
psychology, engineering, and organizational design, etc. Prior to reviewing the 
literature on human factors as it relates to this thesis, the author provides a 
history of human factors science to establish its credibility as a discipline.  
1. History of Human Factors Science 
Human factors science initially focused on human interaction with 
technology, known as human factors and ergonomics, but has expanded to 
encompass all human interaction with the environment. It is generally accepted 
that human factors science originated during World War II, although advances 
that contributed to its formation can be traced to the turn of the 20th century. 
Then, humans were viewed as “unreliable components in complex systems” 
(Sloan, 2009). Prior to World War II, the focus was “designing the human to fit 
the machine” (Wickens, 2000), instead of designing machines to fit the human. If 
a system failure was attributed to a mechanical or material defect, considerable 
effort was spent on identifying and remedying the problem. However, this attitude 
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changed during World War II when the costs of human error were no longer 
acceptable. 
At the beginning of World War I, a need existed to select and train pilots 
quickly for combat in the newly invented airplane. This need impelled the 
development of aviation psychology and the beginning of aeromedical research. 
Although advances were made during this time, the impetus for developing the 
discipline was not met due to a lack of “critical mass of technology and personnel 
as there was in World War II” (Meister, 1999, p. 149).  
With the onset of World War II, two inherent needs were generated and 
became the catalyst for developing the human factors and ergonomics discipline.  
First, the need to mobilize and employ vast numbers of men and 
women made it impractical to select individuals for specific jobs. 
Thus, the focus shifted to designing for people’s capabilities, while 
minimizing the negative consequences of their limitations. Second, 
World War II witnessed the tipping point where the technological 
advances had finally outpaced the ability of people to adapt and 
compensate to poor designs. This was most evident in airplane 
crashes by highly-trained pilots due to problems with control 
configurations and instrument displays. Also, enemy contacts were 
missed by motivated radar operators. Experimental psychologists 
were retained to study these issues by adapting laboratory 
techniques to solve applied problems. Consequently, the discipline 
of human factors and ergonomics was born, even if the people 
involved didn’t realize it at the time. (Shaver, 2009) 
During this time, the U.S. military, in partnership with Europe, brought 
together psychologists, engineers, physicians, and experts drawn from many 
other disciplines to improve human performance (Sloan, 2009). The first efforts 
by these teams to improve human reliability were consistent with traditional 
approaches. For example, improved techniques for personnel selection, 
improved training methods, incentivization, and even the use of drugs to enhance 
vigilance (Sloan, 2009). Many of these approaches did, in fact, improve human 
performance, but the improvements were typically short-lived and research 
showed that the improved human performance degraded as a function of time on 
task (Sloan, 2009). A shift in thought was suggested. Instead of trying to shape 
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the operator to the characteristics of the system, try shaping the system to the 
characteristics of the human operator (Sloan, 2009). This shift in perspective 
marks the emergence of human factors as a discipline.  
Beginning in the 1960s, the discipline continued to expand and influence 
previously established areas, such as computer hardware (1960s), computer 
software (1970s), nuclear power plants and weapon systems (1980s), the 
Internet and automation (1990s), and adaptive technology (2000s). More 
recently, new areas of interest have emerged including neuroergonomics and 
nanoergonomics. An enduring theme since its inception is the ever-expanding 
sphere of influence human factors and ergonomics has sought to encompass 
(Shaver, 2009).  
Human factors science as a discipline for aviation research has come of 
age and is thriving. Its influence has lead to other applications beyond aviation. 
“Less effort now has to be expended on the advocacy of human factors 
contributions or on marketing them because the roles of human factors in 
aviation activities are accepted more willingly and more widely” (Wise, Garland, & 
Hopkin, 2010). What began as a narrowly defined break off of experimental 
psychology that focused on the interaction of people with machine, controls has 
broadly expanded to encompass almost any interaction of people with their 
surroundings (Shaver, 2009). 
2. Human Factors Definitions 
A variety of definitions for human factors are available. The Human 
Factors and Ergonomics Society website provides a running list of definitions 
categorized by professional societies, scientific literature, government agencies, 
industry, and open sources. Many of these definitions pertain specifically to 
select fields of study. For a broader, more contemporary perspective, this thesis 
uses the following definitions. 
• Human factors is concerned with the application of what is known 
about people, their abilities, characteristics, and limitations to the 
design of equipment they use, environments in which they function, 
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and jobs they perform (“Educational Resources, Definitions of 
Human Factors and Ergonomics,” n.d.) 
• Human factors is that field involved in conducting research 
regarding human psychological, social, physical, and biological 
characteristics, maintaining the information obtained from that 
research, and working to apply that information with respect to the 
design, operation, or use of products or systems for optimizing 
human performance, health, safety, and/or habitability. (The 
Dictionary for Human Factors/Ergonomics) (Stramler, 1993) 
3. Human Factors Applications 
As previously demonstrated, human factors science has increasingly 
expanded beyond the narrow focus in aviation that prompted its emergence as a 
discipline, which is reviewed again in more detail in a later section that reviews 
the aviation industry’s research on complacency as a human factor. Among 
many influences human factors science has had on different disciplines, it has 
also been introduced into the business world. The following example is reviewed 
to demonstrate the role human factors can play in the success or decline of a 
business, which has similar attributes to the homeland security enterprise. 
A business concept, balanced innovation (BI), supports the credibility 
human factors has on the success of companies. BI focuses on how humans, 
organizations, and the intellectual components of humans, must balance and 
overlap in a specific manner so success and innovation will result. The Venn 
diagram in Figure 1, provided by Robert Carter, demonstrates how BI works. 
Carter proposes that the intellectual, organizational, and human factors 
components are equally important to success (Carter, 2008). Furthermore, it can 
be seen that the factors are all interconnected, which suggests that successful 
innovation is dependent on balance.  
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Figure 1.  Venn Diagram  
Carter (2008) proposes:  
Your intellectual strength shows that you have the capabilities to 
deliver the product or service that your customers need. It is about 
your core competencies. Your organizational strength shows that 
you have the ability to produce what your customers need. Your 
human strengths show that you understand the needs, that you 
empathize with your customers, and that you are focused on 
satisfying those needs. Your behaviors prove that you can be 
trusted and the way you communicate proves that you are in 
empathy. 
Each factor validates the others. The human factors validate the 
intellectual and organizational, the intellectual factors validate the 
organizational and human, and the organizational factors validate 
the human and intellectual. So the What validates the How and 
Why, and vice versa. This What, How, Why Balance, is key to 
success and is used throughout The Balanced Innovator. In order 
to achieve success in anything we do, we must reach a minimum 
threshold in each of the intellectual, organizational, and human 
factors. If one of these factors is weak, the What, How, and Why 
are not balanced. 
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A review of BI shows that human factors science is becoming more 
prevalent and well regarded when trying to developing strategies for success. 
While BI refers to success in business, the commonalities of the component 
factors (intellectual, humans, organizations) between business organizations and 
homeland security organizations demonstrates that applying research from 
human factors science can contribute to the success of the homeland security 
enterprise.  
C. FOLK SCIENCE AND FOLK PSYCHOLOGY 
Many different scholarly disciplines have studied and critiqued folk science 
in a variety of scholarly journals, academic studies, and other sources by 
physicists, psychologists, philosophers, and cognitive scientists. Reasons for 
exploring folk science are attributed to its inability to be subject to the scientific 
method to prove or disprove a hypothesis and mere fascination with 
understanding how memes are passed on within cultures and become accepted 
as “common wisdom.” For the purpose of this thesis, the prevalent use to 
describe mental states (also known as folk psychology) is explored to understand 
how a term like complacency has developed, evolved, and become accepted 
through common wisdom as a mental state. 
In general, folk psychology is the theory that gives ordinary mental state 
terms their meaning, sometimes referred to as “philosophy of the mind.” Although 
the scope of folk psychology is very broad, contemporary discussion of folk 
psychology in philosophy and cognitive science has focused mainly on the 
portion of folk psychology that guides the prediction and explanation of actions 
(Nichols, 2002). Folk psychology has also been implicated in loftier endeavors, 
such as trying to make sense of Descartes’ reasons for thinking that many ideas 
are innate (Ravenscroft, 2010). The role of folk psychology is so omnipresent in 
everyday life that Jerry Fodor, an American philosopher and cognitive scientist, 
remarked that if folk psychology should turn out to be seriously mistaken, it would 
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be “the greatest intellectual catastrophe in the history of our species” (Nichols, 
2002). 
The concept of folk psychology has played a significant role in philosophy 
of mind and cognitive science over the last half century. Much debate has arisen 
about how it is related to the scientific understanding of the mind and brain 
emerging in psychology and the neurosciences (Stich & Nichols, 2003). The two 
most common and influential questions in the philosophy of the mind are the 
mind-body problem, which asks how mental phenomena are related to physical 
phenomena, and the problem of other minds, which asks how the mental states 
of other people are known (Stich & Nichols, 2003). Folk psychology strives to 
answer the latter. 
A brief examination of folk psychology literature reveals, at the least, three 
distinguishable manners in which it is used: (1) sometimes “folk psychology” is 
used to refer to a particular set of cognitive capacities that include—but are not 
exhausted by—the capacities to predict and explain behavior, (2) the term “folk 
psychology” is also used to refer to a theory of behavior represented in the brain. 
According to many philosophers and cognitive scientists, the set of cognitive 
capacities are underpinned by folk psychology in this sense, and (3) the final 
sense of “folk psychology” is closely associated with the work of David Lewis. In 
this view, folk psychology is a psychological theory constituted by the platitudes 
about the mind ordinary people are inclined to endorse (Ravenscroft, 2010). 
This last category of folk psychology is most applicable to this exploration 
of complacency and is reviewed in more depth. However, prior to reviewing 
Lewis’s work, it is first necessary to explore verificationism, which provides a 
basis for his argument. In the middle of the 20th century, the verificationist 
account of meaning had a major impact on philosophical thought. According to 
the verificationists, the meaning of an empirical claim is closely linked to the 
observations that would verify the claim (Nichols, 2002). They argued that if 
ordinary mental state terms like “belief,” “desire,” and “pain” are to be meaningful, 
they cannot refer to unobservable events occurring inside a person. Rather, the 
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meaning of sentences invoking these terms must be analyzed in terms of 
conditional sentences specifying how someone would behave under various 
circumstances (Nichols, 2002).  
An example of verificationism is as follows. A philosophical behaviorist 
might suggest that the meaning of “John believes that snow is white” could be 
illustrated by: “If you ask John, ‘Is snow white’ he will respond affirmatively” 
(Nichols, 2002). However, this posed a serious problem because their analyses 
would often turn out to be blatantly mistaken or circular—utilizing one mental 
term during the analysis of another. Thus, referring to the aforementioned 
example, the second statement would have to be qualified with “even though 
John believes that snow is white, he may not respond affirmatively unless he is 
paying attention, wants to let you know what he thinks, believes that this can be 
done by responding affirmatively, etc.” (Nichols, 2002). At the same time, 
behavioral philosophers were analyzing behavior; philosophers of science were 
trying to apply verificationism to scientific terms and running into the same 
circularity (Stich & Nichols, 2003).  
To refresh, verificationism requires that the meaning of a theoretical term 
must be specifiable in terms of observables. When philosophers actually tried to 
provide definitions for scientific terms, they always seemed to require additional 
theoretical terms (Hempel, 1964). The reaction to this circular problem was to 
explore a very different account of how theoretical terms obtained their meaning. 
Instead of being defined exclusively in terms of observables, this new account 
proposed a cluster of theoretical terms might get their meaning collectively by 
being embedded within an empirical theory (Hempel, 1964). Thus, the meaning 
of any given theoretical term lies in its theory-specified interconnections with 
other terms, both observational and theoretical (Hempel, 1964).  
At this point, the conversation returns to David Lewis, who was perhaps 
the most influential philosopher of this view. According to Lewis, the meaning of 
theoretical terms is given by what he calls a “functional definition” (Stich & 
Nichols, 2003). He proposed that ordinary terms for mental or psychological 
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states could get their meaning similarly, through observation and theory. If we 
“think of commonsense psychology as a term introducing scientific theory, 
though one invented before there was any such institution as professional 
science,” then the “functional definition” account of the meaning of theoretical 
terms in science can be applied straightforwardly to the mental state terms used 
in commonsense (or folk) psychology (Lewis, 1972).  
In the three decades since Lewis and others developed this account, it 
has become the most widely accepted view about the meaning of mental state 
terms. Since the account maintains that the meanings of mental state terms are 
given by functional definitions (Stich & Nichols, 2003), this view is also known as 
“functionalism.” The logic behind Lewis’s view, and others like him, is one reason 
why philosophers of mind have been concerned to understand the exact nature 
of commonsense (or folk) psychology (Stich & Nichols, 2003). According to 
functionalist view, folk psychology is the theory that gives ordinary mental state 
terms their meaning.  
An interesting caveat to the empirical theory of folk psychology is that it 
may turn out to be mistaken, which is an inherent plausibility in any empirical 
theory. The critical point is that folk psychology is an empirical theory that is 
supposed to explain “the regularity between stimuli and responses” to be found in 
human (and perhaps animal) behavior. Therefore, it might be discovered that the 
states and processes intervening between stimuli and responses are not well 
described by the folk theory that fixes the meaning of mental state terms (Stich & 
Nichols, 2003). The possibility that commonsense psychology might turn out to 
be mistaken is granted by just about everyone who takes functionalism seriously. 
For the last several decades, many prominent philosophers of mind have 
been arguing that this situation is more than a mere possibility. Rather, they 
maintain, a growing body of theory and empirical findings in the cognitive and 
neurosciences strongly suggest that commonsense psychology is mistaken, and 
not just on small points (Stich & Nichols, 2003). Staunch supporters of this view, 
such as Paul Churchland (1981), also known as eliminativists, claim that folk 
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psychology “suffers explanatory failures on an epic scale” and should be a 
serious candidate for outright elimination” (p. 76). Churchland does not stop at 
discarding (or “eliminating”) folk psychological theory. He and other 
“eliminativists” have suggested that, because folk psychology is such a seriously 
defective theory, it should also be concluded that the theoretical terms embedded 
in folk psychology do not really refer to anything.  
While it is not the purpose of this thesis to debate the validity of folk 
psychology, it is important to highlight the controversy about whether mental 
state terms should actually be used, especially when they are blamed for failures 
in homeland security. Applying these controversial ideas to complacency, at the 
very least, supports the purpose of this research to investigate the meaning of 
complacency further. 
D. COMPLEXITY  
1. Complexity Theory  
This review of complexity theory is intended to describe the nature of the 
homeland security enterprise. Literature on complexity theory is not lacking. 
Scholars and scientists offer an impressive amount of literature from a wide array 
of practitioners, such as economists, physicists, administrators, biologists, and 
mathematicians.  
Complexity theory is a relatively new scientific discipline, founded in the 
mid-1980s. Two organizations were founded to investigate complexity. In 1984, 
George Cowan, a research scientist, academician, businessman, and 
philanthropist, started the Santa Fe Institute in Los Alamos, New Mexico; 
Stephen Wolfram began the Center for Complex Systems at the University of 
Illinois in 1986. These institutes became think tanks for scientists and 
practitioners from nearly every discipline. The findings of their efforts revealed 
that complexity and complex adaptive systems are present in everything, 
everywhere. They are in the sciences of physics, biology, sociology, economics, 
political science, and psychology. They are identifiable in human group and 
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social interactions, business arenas, and everywhere human beings live and 
work. They are in the fundamental building blocks of human bodies, and thus, 
are an inherent element of the human condition.  
2. Characteristics of Complexity 
The science of complexity, appropriately, lacks a simple definition. It has 
been used to refer to the study of systems that operate at the ‘‘edge of chaos” 
(also loosely defined concept), to infer structure in the complex properties of 
systems intermediate between perfect order and perfect disorder, or even as a 
simple restatement of the cliché that the behavior of some systems as a whole 
can be more than the sum of their parts (Ziemelis, 2001). However, for the 
purpose of this thesis, a complex system is one in which numerous independent 
elements continuously interact and spontaneously organize and reorganize 
themselves into more and more elaborate structures over time. Complexity is 
characterized by the following:  
• A large number of similar but independent elements or agents 
• Persistent movement and responses by these elements to other 
agents 
• Adaptiveness so that the system adjusts to new situations to 
ensure survival 
• Self-organization, in which order in the system forms spontaneously 
• Local rules that apply to each agent 
• Progression in complexity so that over time the system becomes 
larger and more sophisticated 
Self-organizing complex systems cannot be predicted and they do not 
observe the principle of reduction, i.e., their components cannot be divided up 
and studied in isolation. Complex systems can naturally evolve to a state of self-
organized criticality, in which behavior lies at the border between order and 
disorder. The same system can exhibit order, chaos, and self-organizing 
complexity, depending on the control parameters. 
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Based on this explanation, the homeland security enterprise is 
undoubtedly a complex adaptive system. According to the QHSR (2010): 
Homeland security is a widely distributed and diverse—but 
unmistakable—national enterprise. The term “enterprise” refers to 
the collective efforts and shared responsibilities of Federal, State, 
local, tribal, territorial, nongovernmental, and private-sector 
partners—as well as individuals, families, and communities—to 
maintain critical homeland security capabilities. The use of the term 
connotes a broad-based community with a common interest in the 
public safety and well-being of America and American society that 
is composed of multiple actors and stakeholders whose roles and 
responsibilities are distributed and shared. As the Commander-in-
Chief and the leader of the Executive Branch, the President of the 
United States is uniquely responsible for the safety, security, and 
resilience of the Nation. The White House leads overall homeland 
security policy direction and coordination. Individual Federal 
agencies, in turn, are empowered by law and policy to fulfill various 
aspects of the homeland security mission. The Secretary of 
Homeland Security leads the Federal agency as defined by statute 
charged with homeland security: preventing terrorism and 
managing risks to critical infrastructure; securing and managing the 
border; enforcing and administering immigration laws; safeguarding 
and securing cyberspace; and ensuring resilience to disasters. 
However, as a distributed system, no single entity is responsible for 
or directly manages all aspects of the enterprise. (pp. viii–ix) 
Each of these governmental components has their own respective missions, 
organizational structures, and operational procedures, and operate within the 
confines of their jurisdictional authorities and statutes imposed by their level of 
government. Additionally, the inclusion of nongovernmental, private sector 
organizations, and citizens exponentially increases its dynamism; however, this 
thesis focuses only on governmental organizations. Despite each working 
towards individual missions, an overarching unity of effort occurs in which they 
interact on many different levels to support one common mission. Their success 
relies on how effectively these interactions happen. 
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3. Complexity Theory and Organization and Management 
Complexity theory has been used extensively in the field of strategic 
management and organizational studies. A plethora of literature is available that 
applies complexity theory to management and organizational science from high-
reputation scientists and practitioners. Their intention is not to simply import 
ideas from an emerging interdisciplinary area, but to use them to inform rich, 
theoretically grounded depictions of how organizations operate (Anderson, 
Meyer, Eisenhardt, Carley, & Pettigrew, 1999), and how management operates 
within the organization.  
The findings have been significant in organization science; they have 
emphasized how interaction of elements in a system produces surprising, 
emergent behavior that can be understood through formal models, even if those 
models cannot necessarily predict how a given system will evolve. This emphasis 
constitutes a foundation for a new way of thinking about how to model nonlinear 
behavior in organizations (Anderson et al., 1999). The findings have also been 
significant when complexity theory is applied to management theories. Also 
referred to as “management complexity,” this research serves to inform 
“organizational complexity.” 
a. Complexity Theory and Organizations 
The literature reviewed for complexity in organizations is from Philip 
Anderson (1999), from Amos Tuck School at Dartmouth College. He explains 
how complex organizations exhibit surprising, nonlinear behavior (p. 216). He 
argues that complex adaptive system models represent a genuinely new way of 
simplifying the complex, which are characterized by four key elements: agents 
with schemata, self-organizing networks sustained by importing energy, 
coevolution to the edge of chaos, and system evolution based on recombination 
(p. 216). The strategic direction of complex organizations consists of establishing 
and modifying environments within which effective, improvised, self-organized 
solutions can evolve. Managers influence strategic behavior by altering the 
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fitness landscape for local agents and reconfiguring the organizational 
architecture within which agents adapt.  
Organization theory has not yet caught up with the sophisticated tools that 
have emerged for analyzing the behavior of complex adaptive systems. 
“[R]emarkable new vistas are opening up, thanks to the melding of the science of 
complexity and organization theory” (Anderson, 1999, p. 216) and the increasing 
availability of new techniques for modeling nonlinear behavior. 
Organization theory has historically borrowed from a number of 
parent disciplines. Because complexity theory has developed along 
a very interdisciplinary path, it may be that in the end, organization 
theory contributes as much as it borrows to the development of 
insight into the behavior of complex systems. Many modern 
organizations are complex adaptive systems par excellence, and 
we who study them should eventually lead instead of follow efforts 
to understand the fundamental nature of nonlinear, self-organized 
structures. (p. 230) 
b. Complexity Theory and Management 
The review of the “complexity management” consists primarily of the work 
of Ralph Stacey, Professor of Management and Director of the Complexity and 
Management Centre at the Business School of the University of Hertfordshire in 
the United Kingdom (UK), as he is probably considered the most influential in his 
field. It is important to emphasize that other, differing complexity management 
works by reputable scholars exist, but they emphasize different aspects of 
management and different management theories. 
According to Stacey (1992), the significance of complexity theory for 
management is that complexity-based thinking transcends the limitations of pre-
existing management theory and practice. Provided that the key finding of 
complexity theory is the effective unpredictability of the future, the common 
assumption among managers that part of their responsibility is to decide where 
the organization is going, to make decisions towards that end, is seen as a 
dangerous delusion. Management, in the midst of increasing complexity and 
information overload, can react by becoming quite intolerant of ambiguity. 
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Factors, targets, and organizational structures all need to be nailed down. 
Uncertainty is ignored or denied (Stacey, 1992). 
In management, responsibility is often considered the enunciation of 
mission, the determination of strategy, and the elimination of deviation (Stacey, 
1992). Stability is viewed as the ultimate safeguard against anxiety, which could 
otherwise become overwhelming. All these managerial reflexes, many of them 
seeming commonsensical, are actually counter-productive when viewed from a 
complexity theory perspective. 
In review of how well managed businesses (and the public sector 
agencies that emulate them) should continue, some basic wisdom is commonly 
provided. Typically, a Chief Executive Officer should supervise a management 
team with a vision and strategy supported by a common culture. The 
organization should stick to its core competencies, build on its strengths, adapt to 
the market environment, and keep its eyes focused on the bottom line 
(Rosenhead, 2001). Despite the critical hammering taken by 1970s-style long-
term planning, strategic management will nevertheless incorporate the tasks of 
goal formation, environmental analysis, strategy formulation, evaluation and 
implementation, and strategic control (Rosenhead, 2001). This way of doing 
business is completely wrong from the perspective of complexity management. 
This kind of management theory and practice, Stacey and others state, 
bears the hallmarks of the over-rationalist thinking that has dominated since the 
triumphs of Newton and Descartes (Rosenhead, 2001). An organization is like 
the universe, a clockwork machine thought to be entirely predictable; good 
management should enjoy similarly reliable performance. However, discoveries 
by the theorists of complexity and chaos show that even the universe and natural 
world do not operate this way; this revelation of creative disorder in the universe 
needs to be taken to heart by managers. The consequences, as Stacey (1993) 
comprehensively summarizes, are to turn much management orthodoxy on its 
head. A few consequences are listed as follows. 
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• Analysis loses its primacy 
• Contingency (cause and effect) loses its meaning 
• Long-term planning becomes impossible 
• Visions become illusions 
• Consensus and strong cultures become dangerous 
• Statistical relationships become dubious. 
E. HIGH-RELIABILITY ORGANIZATIONS AND RELIABILITY-ORIENTED 
BEHAVIORS  
Jeff Ericksen and Lee Dyer (2004) from Cornell University offer literature 
on high-reliability organizations. Their expertise lies in strategic human resource 
management (SHRM). Their research includes applying the theory and research 
on HROs using a behavioral approach. A review of their literature provides a 
basic understanding of HROs and reliability-oriented employee behaviors 
(ROEBs) likely to foster organizational reliability. Ericksen and Dyer (2004) state 
that HROs: 
[S]trive to achieve virtually problem free performance under the 
most trying of circumstances….their organizational goals are both 
unique and quite clear: to avoid disasters, breakdowns, errors and 
the like….people play a crucial role in helping organizations to 
achieve high reliability performance. Or, put in the negative, that 
inappropriate employee behavior tends to be a common cause of 
organizational failure….that the presence of trying conditions (the 
complexity of the system, high levels of interdependence between 
and among people and technology, and external volatility) requires 
organizing systems (and, thus, employee behaviors) that differ 
substantially from those used in more stable settings. (pp. 5–6) 
The basic principles of HROs (Ericksen & Dyer, 2004) include the 
following.  
• Diligence—the capacity to anticipate or detect surprises early and 
without compromising routine operations  
• Facileness—the capacity to switch quickly and easily from stable 
and routine activity to flexible and novel action and then back again 
• Fluidity—the capacity to operate effectively in chaotic situations 
where traditional order has collapsed 
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• Generativeness—the capacity to function as a learning 
organization, gaining knowledge from successes and failures, as 
well as the experiences of others 
Furthermore, review of literature from Ericksen and Dyers (2004) suggests 
that ROEBs are especially valuable to reliability seeking organizations that 
operate under “trying conditions.” If cultivated correctly, employees that 
demonstrate these ROEBs will contribute to making an organization successful. 
• Diligence. “Diligence refers to an organization’s capacity to 
anticipate or detect surprises early and without compromising 
routine operations” (p. 11).  
• Ability to ascertain. “People in HROs are chronically on the lookout 
for the unexpected” (p. 12). 
• Communication. “They strive to avoid distortions and 
misunderstandings by conversing and corresponding in a direct, 
clear, precise, and accurate manner” (p. 12). 
• Facileness. “Requires people to initiate and deploy, to know when 
and how to switch from one mode of organizing to the other,” 
between “well planned and practiced response tactics” and “almost 
wholly emergent processes” (p. 13). 
• Ability to initiate. “Initiate appropriate action to mitigate and rectify 
unexpected events” (p. 13). 
1. Challenges of High-Reliability Organizations 
This literature is reviewed to provide insight as to the challenges that the 
homeland security enterprise faces as a HRO. Todd R. LaPorte and Paula M. 
Consolini (1991) from the University of California, Berkeley have produced 
literature that focuses on the challenges of public HROs attempting to keep pace 
with the technological advances. They claim that public administration 
practitioners and scholars harbor no illusions about organizational perfection (p. 
19). They do not expect bureaucracies to be error-free and acknowledge that 
people make mistakes and machines break. No one is perfect and no 
organization is likely to achieve this ideal.  
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Indeed, administrative folklore teaches that error making is the normal 
bureaucratic condition, yet some organizations must not make serious errors 
because their work is too important and the effects of their failures too disastrous. 
This scenario is especially true with organizations that operate very beneficial, 
yet costly, and hazardous technologies, which is also true for various functions 
within the homeland security enterprise. 
Increasingly, any failure of these technologies is perceived by both 
their operators and the public to have such potentially grave 
consequences as to warrant the absolute avoidance of failure. 
Examples abound: operating nuclear power plants; industrializing 
genetic engineering; air-traffic control; identifying dangerous drugs; 
assuring the safety of bridges and dams; using pesticides in 
agriculture; and, less dramatically, distributing electric power. 
(LaPorte & Consolini, 1991, p. 19) 
While the theme of this literature focuses primarily on introduction of 
technologies to HROs, valuable, general conclusions for homeland security can 
be reached. 
Current research based tacitly on the trial-and-error, and 
decisionmaking perspective reinforces unexamined assumptions 
about what phenomena are important and what problems should be 
taken up. Much organizational research is driven by practical 
problems-that is, it is prompted by outcomes that managers, 
academics, and policy outsiders view as undesirable, unwarranted, 
and unnecessary. It is attentive to concerns about decisionmaking 
and policy direction of “machine” bureaucracy without addressing 
the possibility that organizational life may have gotten beyond our 
implicit and unexamined understandings of it…A second implication 
closely follows. Most HROs provide important public services that 
require operating for long periods at high-peak capacity. Failures of 
their task and production technologies can be catastrophic-the 
costs of major failures seem much greater than the lessons learned 
from them. Public and official concern has grown concerning HRO 
operations, costs, and safety performance. In responding to these 
concerns, analysts and policymakers have tended to suppose that 
behavioral patterns in effective HROs do not vary significantly from 
those in the more familiar, effective trial and-error organizations. If 
this were the case, there would be little reason to give special 
attention to HROs, except perhaps to placate a nervous public. The 
idea, however, that there is a close similarity between HROs and 
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trial-and-error organizations is unlikely…Criticisms and proposals 
for change are likely to underestimate and be underinformed 
regarding their consequences for organizational operations. 
Overlooking the requisites for high-reliability organizations and the 
costs and processes that assure them is a source of major policy 
error and the roots of tragic remedies. (LaPorte & Consolini, 1991, 
p. 43) 
F. HOMELAND SECURITY DOCTRINE AND REPORTS 
This review of homeland security doctrine is intended to accomplish two 
things, 1) determine the deference complacency is given as a threat to homeland 
security, and 2) draw conclusions as to the inferred factors of complacency. This 
literature is reviewed because it is guiding doctrine that steers activities in 
support of the homeland security mission throughout the entire enterprise. While 
the White House and the DHS are the primary authors, collaboration among 
many stakeholders from various disciplines at various levels of government 
within the enterprise contribute to the final product. 
The 9/11 Commission Report stated that the DHS bears the responsibility 
of assessing threats and determining the adequacy of the government’s plans 
and progress to address and respond to those threats (National Commission on 
Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004). This statement is further 
reiterated in the National Security Strategy (The White House, 2010):  
Homeland security traces its roots to traditional and historic 
functions of government and society, such as civil defense, 
emergency response, law enforcement, customs, border patrol, and 
immigration. In the aftermath of 9/11 and the foundation of the 
Department of Homeland Security, these functions have taken on 
new organization and urgency. Homeland security, therefore, 
strives to adapt these traditional functions to confront new threats 
and evolving hazards. 
While the DHS has recognized, analyzed, and developed strategies to “confront 
new threats and evolving hazards,” complacency is not clearly addressed in the 
homeland security mission’s core components. 
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The QHSR states the five core homeland security missions.  
• Mission 1: Preventing Terrorism and Enhancing Security 
• Mission 2: Securing and Managing Our Boarder 
• Mission 3: Enforcing and Administering Our Immigration Laws 
• Mission 4: Safeguarding and Securing Cyberspace; 
• Mission 5: Ensuring Resilience to Disasters (Department of 
Homeland Security, 2010, p. 19) 
The QHSR also listed nine assumptions about the nation’s security environment 
that influenced the strategic framework to support these missions. One of the 
assumptions states, “[W]e must guard against the danger of complacency as 
memories of the 9/11 attacks and other major crises recede” (Department of 
Homeland Security, 2010, p. 8). The term “complacency” is highlighted in bold; 
however, it is not mentioned in the rest of the document. Excluding complacency, 
all the assumptions are explicitly addressed in the five missions’ goals and 
objectives.  
The NSHS that preceded the QHSR also referred to complacency: 
We must guard against complacency and balance the sense of 
optimism that is fundamental to the American character with the 
sober recognition that despite our best efforts, future catastrophes 
—natural and man-made—will occur, and thus we must always 
remain a prepared Nation. (The White House, 2007, p. 6) 
In this case, it is addressed in more depth, but it is still not defined and it is not 
demonstrated how preparedness will balance the “sense of optimism” with the 
“sober recognition” that future catastrophes will occur. Like the QHSR, it is not 
mentioned in the rest of the document.  
G. DEFINITIONS OF COMPLACENCY 
To review the technical definitions of complacency, the author has 
consulted the Oxford English Dictionary (OED), arguably the most regarded 
source for definitions, and the Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary (MWOD). The 
OED (2010) provides the following definitions, “The fact or state of being pleased 
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with a thing or person; tranquil pleasure or satisfaction in something or some 
one; The fact or state of being pleased with oneself; Tranquil pleasure or 
satisfaction in one’s own condition or doings; Self-satisfaction; Contented 
acquiescence or consent; Disposition or wish to please, or comply with the 
wishes of, others,” which is a broad range of definitions that demonstrate varying 
interpretations of the term. The Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary (2011) 
defines complacency as “self-satisfaction especially when accompanied by 
unawareness of actual dangers or deficiencies; or an instance of usually 
unaware or uninformed self-satisfaction.”  
Some lexicographers argue that dictionary terms are not incontrovertible 
authority and are best understood by how the terms are used in context. A 
dictionary is supposed to provide careful analysis of examples of words in use 
and draw conclusions and consensus on what a word means, but sometimes the 
definitions are ill suited for stating the meaning of the word (McKean, 2009). 
Therefore, it is essential to look beyond the dictionary definitions and review how 
complacency is used in context.  
H. COMPLACENCY IN CONTEXT 
This literature consists of the aforementioned government documents, 
journals, weblogs, editorials, and public remarks made by homeland security 
professionals. In addition to those noted in the introduction, the following are 
some that were reviewed. 
In February 2008, former Secretary Michael Chertoff attended a 
roundtable sponsored by the Christian Science Monitor. This roundtable was 
summarized and presented as an article in HS Today. The author states that 
during this roundtable, Chertoff warned against “creeping complacency” over the 
preparedness for all catastrophes (Kimery, 2008). “Complacency is the greatest 
enemy that we have and the greatest challenge we have” (Kimery, 2008). 
Furthermore, Chertoff (2008) stated,  
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We’ve got a lot more to do … The biggest [question] my successor 
will face is, ‘Does the public and does Congress have the will to 
stick to the program, or are we going to start seeing people 
cannibalize homeland security because we have not been attacked 
for six years; it doesn’t seem like a burning issue anymore. There’s 
a lot of other things we could spend money on, and so, therefore, 
we will start to allow the progress to be degraded. 
These statements imply that a temporal factor is involved in complacency; that 
complacency increases as time passes. Also, it can be inferred from this 
statement that “will” is required to work through complacency and complacency 
can degrade success. 
In the same article, the author references how, in May 2005, former U.S. 
counterterrorism czar Richard Clarke told a homeland security conference in 
Washington, DC that he feared both the government and public were slipping 
into a false sense of complacency toward security despite the probability the 
United States faces another wave of attacks (Kimery, 2008). 
It’s been 44 months since 9/11 and there is, in some locations 
around the country and in popular opinion, a growing sense of 
complacency,” Clarke said, emphasizing that “we can’t get back to 
normal. We can never get back to normal. (Kimery, 2008) 
This statement includes multiple inferences about complacency. The first is a 
temporal factor as inferred by providing the quantity of months since 9/11. The 
second is a location factor, presumably a proximity factor. The third is his 
warning against returning to normal indicates that normal is analogous to 
complacency. The fourth is that popular opinion affects complacency. 
Furthermore, Clarke continues to state, 
Someday [terrorists] will come back; there will be a second 
wave…And if we are complacent—if we think because we’ve 
[crossed] out all the names on our chart, if we think that we don’t 
have to reduce our vulnerabilities and improve our security here at 
home—we will suffer another major attack. (Clarke, 2008) 
From this statement, it can be inferred that complacency will persist if the United 
States minimizes its responsibilities to killing terrorists and does not continue to 
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reduce this nation’s vulnerabilities to improve security. He also implies that 
complacency will cause another major attack. 
Finally, this article on complacency includes a bold statement from 
Chertoff that provides insight into a culture that breeds complacency. 
One thing I am sick and tired of is an approach to everything we do, 
which is, ‘Let’s not pay attention until the disaster happens. Then 
we will have a hearing. We will punish somebody, and then we will 
spend a lot of money making up for what happened afterwards. 
(Chertoff, 2008) 
In the same vain, the author states: 
Chertoff isn’t the only government official to make this observation, 
though—I’ve heard the same thing from the mouths of many; that 
it’s only after a calamity that remedial action is, or will be, taken. I 
remember David Kay, the former chief of the CIA’s hunt for WMDs 
in Iraq, telling me back in the mid-90s that he didn’t know how 
many high-level meetings he’d participated in that discussed 
terrorist attacks and other assorted nightmarish catastrophic events 
that could potentially kill tens of thousands of Americans the 
conclusion of which was, basically, nothing would be done until 
after the fact. (Kimery, 2008) 
It can be concluded from these statements that complacency instills a reactionary 
attitude; conversely being proactive is opposed to complacency. 
During remarks made to the National Cargo Security Council, James Loy 
(2004), former Deputy Secretary of the DHS, spoke of a “complacency gene” that 
leads everyone to have the “tendency to default into a careless loss of focus.” 
This figure of speech implies that complacency is inherent in people and causes 
a careless loss of focus. He further states: 
We now have another year’s worth of attacks—in Madrid, Istanbul, 
Baghdad, and in Saudi Arabia—that indicate we must continue to 
fight that complacency and maintain an unprecedented level of 
vigilance in everything we do…our emotions must not be dulled by 
the passage of time. (Loy, 2004)  
This statement implies that a temporal factor exists to complacency, that 
complacency will increase with time, complacency is an emotion, and suggests 
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that vigilance is antonymous to complacency. “We must hold onto our sense of 
urgency. Of course, despite many successes, there is still plenty of work left to 
be done. As I mentioned, complacency cannot allow us to rest long on past 
accomplishments. Instead, we must continue to look for opportunities to work 
together.” (Loy, 2004). Loy implies that holding on to a sense of urgency will 
counter complacency and successes of previous accomplishments can induce 
complacency.  
In an opinion piece published on FoxNews.com, Judith Miller (2010), who 
is an author and commentator of Fox News, contributing editor of “City 
Magazine” of the Manhattan Institute, and Pulitzer prize-winning investigative 
reporter for the New York Times, claims that complacency is “our greatest 
threat.” This piece argues against the reduced funding of the Transit Security 
Grant Program for New York City in 2010. She states, “Vigorous counterterrorism 
effort requires consistent support. That’s tough almost nine years after 9/11 
without another major successful attack on American soil. Success breeds 
complacency—our greatest threat” (2010). It can be deduced that this usage 
demonstrates a temporal factor and that previous success is a contributor to its 
manifestation. The persuasive manner in which it is used also suggests that 
complacency can be employed as a political term. 
In “The Relationship of Warning and Response in Homeland Security,” 
John Brinkerhoff (2001), senior editor of the Journal of Homeland Security, 
claims that it is an American tradition to be “surprised” by major events, such as 
9/11, but asserts that Americans would not be surprised at all if it were not for 
complacency and other human errs. He emphasizes the direct correlation 
between complacency and the ability for homeland security to commit to a swift 
and effective response to warnings that are out there about impending attacks on 
the United States.  
Furthermore, Brinkerhoff (2001) provides a definition of the complacency 
as being the “attitude of self-satisfaction that inhibits consideration of unpleasant 
things,” which fosters the inertia of the status quo. He contends that complacency 
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is a good thing or a bad thing depending upon who is being complacent and it 
can be an indicator of success for those responsible for homeland security, and it 
can be problematic if it is the prevalent attitude of people required to pay 
constant attention to unpleasant things.  
The bulk of the people are complacent, and in a well-ordered 
society have good reason and every right to be complacent…[I]n 
one sense, the main goal of an effective homeland security 
program is to afford ordinary citizens the luxury of complacency 
about their security…Complacency is a problem when it is the 
prevalent attitude of persons whose duty requires constant 
attention to unpleasant things. (Brinkerfoff, 2001) 
He claims that complacency results out of habit and attitude when 
boredom sets in and attention is on other things.  
Brinkerhoff (2001) further states that homeland security practitioners 
responsible for emergency preparedness must never be complacent. His 
recommendation to address complacency is super dedication to preparedness by 
those in charge of the governments, institutions, and corporations of America 
because if leadership demonstrates complacency, so will those who work for 
them. Finally, he explicitly states that complacency is a result of self-satisfaction 
(Brinkerhoff, 2001). 
On May 5, 2009, during a media briefing, Secretary Napolitano (2009) 
stated her cautious optimism about the how the knowledge the Center for 
Disease Control was giving them a better understanding of the H1N1 virus and 
the guidance on school closings had changed. She stated: 
This is not a time for complacency or the belief that we can simply 
declare victory over H1N1 and move on…This is why we are 
preparing now for what may come in the future. We are not in a 
place where we can simply sit back and see what happens. We 
have to lean forward. And we have to remain prepared because 
nature has a way of being little unpredictable and throwing us a 
curveball from time to time. (Department of Homeland Security, 
2009) 
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This mention of complacency indicates that focus, working together, and 
preparedness will counter its effects.  
I. FACTORS OF COMPLACENCY 
1. Psychological and Biological Factors  
Based on the inherent nature of complacency, as implied by former 
Deputy Secretary Loy and others, it is adventageous to explore the pscyhological 
factors that influence complacency in more depth. To gain an informed 
understanding of these factors it is necessary to review literature about some 
already defined concepts of psychology, such as self-efficacy and optimism bias. 
In the Encyclopedia of Human Behavior, world-renowned behaviorism 
Psychologist Albert Bandura (1994) defines self-efficacy as people’s beliefs 
about their capabilities to produce designated levels of performance that exercise 
influence over events that determine how people feel, think, motivate 
themselves, and behave. In summary, this scholarly literature concludes that 
people believe they have the ability to affect the outcome of a situation and 
believe that they can make the result one in which they desire it to be. 
Scholarly references of optimism bias are found in a broad range of 
literature to make sense of why, for example, people expect to live longer and be 
healthier than average, they underestimate their likelihood of getting a divorce, 
and overestimate their prospects for success on the job market. It is the tendency 
of people to be over-optimistic of the outcomes of planned actions. According to 
this literature, accepted broadly by psychologists, people are naturally prone to 
be optimists even with knowledge of prevailing threats. The findings of a recent 
study conducted at the University of Kansas (2009) finds that “Despite calamities 
from economic recessions, wars and famine to a flu epidemic afflicting the 
Earth…humans are by nature optimistic.” These psychological studies and 
behavioral research suggests that homeland security practitioners may be 
naturally prone towards optimism bias despite awareness of dangers.  
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Self-efficacy and optimism bias can contribute to an attitude of 
complacency. Individuals’ high optimism (optimism bias) about the outcomes 
they have the ability to effect (self-efficacy) can lead to a feeling of confidence or 
self-satisfaction. Self-satisfaction is part of the technical definition of 
complacency, as well as what Brinkerhoff concluded. 
Some literature suggests that the psychological factors that can contribute 
to complacency have a biological basis. In Nature, International Weekly Journal 
of Science, a study about the optimism and neurology shows that activity in two 
limbic areas of the brain, the rostral anterior cingulate cortex and amygdale, 
reflects an optimistic attitude (Phelps, 2007). This literature scientifically 
demonstrates that people may have a natural predisposition towards 
complacency, assuming that optimism is a psychological factor that contributes 
to it.  
2. Situational and Environmental Factors 
The contextual examples of complacency imply that a temporal factor 
exists to complacency. The following literature provides possible explanation for 
this factor. Christopher Bellavita (2005), executive editor of Homeland Security 
Affairs, discusses the issue attention cycle by describing the cyclical evolution of 
homeland security in public opinion and government action regarding attacks and 
threats. The temporal significance is that some issues follow five predictable 
stages. 
• Stage 1: Preproblem 
• Stage 2: Alarmed discovery—Entails a euphoric enthusiasm to do 
something quickly about the problem and is triggered by an 
especially dramatic event 
• Stage 3: Awareness of the costs of making significant progress 
• Stage 4: Gradual decline of intense public (including public leaders) 
interest in the problem. Some people become discouraged about 
how long it is going to take to “solve” the problem. Others become 
bored with it or move on to other, more immediately pressing, 
concerns. 
 37 
• Stage 5: Post-problem stage 
Further review of stage four, “the public—including public leaders—
gradually loses interest in the problem” supports that as time moves forward, the 
sense of urgency that Loy referenced diminishes. It can also be phrased, “as 
time move forward complacency increases,” just as Chertoff insinuated in his 
warning against “creeping complacency” (Kimery, 2008). 
Another factor of complacency can be found in the environmental 
construct of complex organizations. An emphasis on organizational construct and 
management is discussed in “The Danger of Complacency” on the Washington 
Post website. A group of 13 West Point Cadets and four of their instructors wrote 
this discussion article in which they address complacency in complex 
organizations. Specifically, in response to the question they were asked about 
how an organization (General Motors (GM)) could be revived in two years. Their 
response was, 
When a group of individuals work together for quite some time, the 
environment becomes comfortable. Unfortunately, a comfortable 
environment brings contentment, stagnation and group think. 
Before long, there is no striving for advancement or progress. In the 
army, leadership is continuously cycled....This consistent 
leadership change keeps unit atmosphere continuously fresh, 
preventing complacency issues like GM had. (West Point Cadets, 
2010). 
This literature suggests that organizational policy and management can 
affect the environment that fosters complacency. Homeland security agencies 
are complex organizations akin to GM and the military that can benefit from 
understanding complacency affected by the environment.  
J. COMPLACENCY RESEARCH IN AVIATION INDUSTRY 
Research conducted by esteemed social scientists in the aviation industry 
may provide valuable insight on how to address complacency in homeland 
security. The connective threads between aviation and homeland security are 
that both are affected by human performance and attitude and layers of people 
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have different responsibilities that must work towards one mission. The relevance 
of applying this research is that upon assessment of failures, or warning against 
potential failures, in homeland security, the attitude of complacency is blamed as 
it often is in the aviation industry.  
An abundance of literature is available from psychologists, social 
scientists, cognitive scientists and behaviorists about complacency in the aviation 
industry. This literature is provided in the form of scholarly books, journals, 
articles, and presentation material at significant conferences. The literature 
provides a summary of human factors science (the aviation industry was the 
chief contributor to the development of the human factors discipline over the last 
several decades), and current statistical research, analysis, and 
recommendations to address complacency within aviation organizations and 
training programs.  
1. Accident Investigations 
The aviation industry enjoys little margin for error and accident 
investigations consistently reveal that “complacent” human performance is 
responsible for a series of human errors, or chain of events, that accumulated 
and result in an accident. Complacency is identified as one of the dirty dozen of 
human factors in the aviation maintenance industry. Blue Tuna, a human factors, 
code of federal regulations and occupational safety and health administration 
training provider, interviewed repair station managers, technicians, quality 
managers and FAA inspectors, and across the board, complacency ranks as one 
of the dirtiest dozen (Blue Tuna, 2010). 
Research shows a 20/80 ratio of accidents is attributed to human errors 
induced by complacency—20 percent of accidents are caused by a machine, 
whereas 80 percent are caused by some human element (Grey Owl Aviation 
Consultants, 2004). This staggering statistic has warranted scholarly 
investigation by social scientists as to what complacency in aviation is. Their 
deductive hypothesis is that if an error is part of a chain of events that led to an 
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accident, diffusing the judgment that led to the error can prevent the accident. 
Their research has led to a specific focus on human factors in training programs 
and changes in organizational construct (Grey Owl Aviation Consultants, 2004). 
2. Complacency in Aviation 
For the purpose of this thesis, complacency in the aviation industry is, “A 
mental state where an aviator acts, unaware of actual danger or deficiencies. He 
still has the capacity to act in a competent way—but for some reason, or another, 
this capacity is not activated. He has lost his guard without knowing it” (Fahlgren 
& Hagdahl, 1990).  
Complacency is caused by the very things that should prevent 
accidents, factors like experience, training and knowledge 
contribute to complacency. Complacency makes crews skip 
hurriedly through checklists, fail to monitor instruments closely or 
utilize all navigational aids. It can cause a crew to use shortcuts 
and poor judgment and to resort to other malpractices that mean 
the difference between hazardous performance and professional 
performance. (Wiener, 1981) 
Symptoms of complacency include the following: 
• Acceptance of lower standards of work performance 
• Degradation of feeling to remain knowledgeable and proficient at 
work 
• Increased boredom and Inattention to tasks 
• Acceptance and satisfaction with current conditions at work 
• Increased feeling of well being even if tasks are building up 
• Neglect of important safety itinerary at work 
Richard S. Jensen Ph.D. (1995), a former pilot, editor of The International 
Journal of Aviation Psychology, and director of the Aviation Psychology 
Laboratory at The Ohio State University, has written many comprehensive books 
on pilot judgment. In one of his books, Pilot Judgment and Crew Resource 
Management, he provides a clear understanding of pilot judgment by 
emphasizing how it can be applied to improving safety in aviation. Specifically, he 
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delves into complacency and concludes that five types of complacency exist 
(Jensen, 1995): 
• Task Induced Complacency—This type of complacency includes 
the following key components and characteristics: 
• Occurs after a high key period of intense, mental stimulating 
and skill induced workload  
• Occurs when personnel are operating in a low key setting, 
and having the mindset that the “worst is over,” tasks faced 
seem routine and mundane 
• Occurs when vigilance of personnel is reduced significantly 
and guard is let down  
• Occurs when personnel forget certain details performing 
their tasks  
• Occurs when personnel are not able to react appropriately to 
new and sudden injects 
Examples of task induced complacency are pilots, after a long haul flight 
in treacherous weather conditions, on final approach in good weather, execute a 
wheels-up landing. Also, in the air traffic control tower, after a heavy session, 
directing continuous traffic flow into and out of the terminal area, now faced with 
only two aircraft in the airspace forgets to monitor the height altitudes properly 
leading to a confliction. 
• Organization induced complacency—This type of complacency 
includes the following key components and characteristics and 
stresses how management plays an important role in preventing 
complacency: 
• Occurs when poor management fails to hold people 
accountable for their wrong actions at work 
• Occurs when management becomes satisfied with mediocre 
performances 
• Occurs when workers have the propensity to break rules and 
take short cuts in performing their tasks assuming they will 
not be punished  
• Occurs when this sub-par working style becomes a norm 
• Occurs when non-productive workers are permitted to 
continue working and keep making errors 
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• Occurs when personnel stop reporting errors and mistakes 
at work 
• Occurs when productive workers who are creative and care 
for the company will soon also become complacent at their 
tasks 
An example of organization-induced complacency is lazy maintenance 
personnel who do slipshod work in a short amount of time; hence, finishing their 
mistake ridden tasks of the day so they can go home early, and at the same time, 
earn the same pay as dedicated workers. These dedicated workers who are 
meticulous and work long hours to ensure rectification of aircraft is proper will 
soon also develop the wrong attitude since management is not penalizing the 
errors and behavior that are occurring. 
• Fatigue/stress induced complacency—This type of complacency 
includes the following key components: 
• Workers are faced either with fatigue or stress due to 
external factors, such as insufficient sleep and marital 
problems 
• Workers are not in the right frame of mind to work 
• Workers are not as meticulous and pay less attention to 
certain seemingly mundane tasks 
• Workers become complacent and start beginning to see or 
hear what they expect to see or hear in a given scenario 
instead of what is actually transpiring in the real time 
scenario 
An example of fatigue/stress induced complacency is a fatigued pilot lining 
up on the runway, expects a takeoff clearance, and upon hearing the controller’s 
voice, assumes it is for takeoff and fails to hear and read back air traffic control 
clearance properly, then proceeds to take off with a vehicle on the runway. In the 
same context, a stressed controller upon telling a pilot to line up and wait 
neglects to look at the aircraft and remains fixated on the vehicle on the runway, 
as he expects the pilot to wait and not to take off. 
• Dependency complacency—This type of complacency includes the 
following key components and characteristics: 
 42 
• One is working alongside personnel known to be capable, 
dependable, and proficient at their jobs 
• Workers doing similar tasks will have the tendency to 
become lazy and complacent 
• One experiences misplaced confidence because the co-
worker is the consummate professional who will be able to 
catch any mistakes 
• Workers do not do their own work properly and 
conscientiously, and rely on co-workers 
An example of dependency complacency is when in a cockpit 
environment, maintenance workers have a tendency to neglect basic duties and 
not follow proper standard operating procedures (SOPs) because they feel that a 
partner is always available who is up to speed to counter check them. 
• Automation and complacency—This type of complacency includes 
the following key components and characteristics: 
• Occurs when there are advancements in technology 
• Occurs when there are changes in the roles from main 
operators in control of the systems to merely supervisory 
roles 
• Occurs when personnel take less ownership as they are 
lulled to thinking that the computer will not make mistakes 
and will perform everything well 
An example of automation complacency is not monitoring instruments or 
gauges in the cockpit properly, and even if they are sending out wrong signals, 
failure to act as the computer is more sophisticated and is always right. 
After describing the different types of complacency, Jensen (1995) offers 
ways to counter complacency. 
• Maintain Awareness: Keeping aware of the surrounding situation by 
rehearsing in the mind the consequences of complacency by 
reading accident reports in a person’s given profession 
• Adopt a Positive Attitude: Adopting a positive attitude by becoming 
more professionally involved at work, reading up-to-date materials 
to level up knowledge of them 
• Manage Expectations: Going through contingency checklists and 
repeating them to avoid hearing or seeing what is expected to be 
heard or seen, which can be done by saying these checklists aloud 
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• Maintain Current Training: Even if deemed proficient, go through 
different training and seek to improve by asking other people who 
may know more and offer a different insight. Recurrent training to 
hone skills, and refresh knowledge and training in different 
scenarios to be well equipped in dealing with them. 
 
• Create New Challenges: Create challenges by working with another 
person in competing who will make the least mistakes and trying to 
catch the other person’s mistakes will improve standards and 
reduce complacency 
• Ask ‘What If?’: Ask what if this goes wrong when performing tasks, 
so that the mind is stimulated and mentally prepared to deal with 
unforeseen scenarios 
• Critique Performance: Continuously critique performance by striving 
for the perfect way to do things. Constantly try to be better when 
getting things done. 
• Maintain Physical fitness: Good physical fitness levels builds up the 
necessary endurance to protect against stress and fatigue induced 
complacency so that good decisions can be made and small details 
are not neglected 
3. Complacency in Organizations  
NASA has also conducted extensive research on complacency. Steve 
Denning (2006), formerly the program director, knowledge management, at the 
World Bank, advises organizations on knowledge management and 
organizational storytelling. He is an author on leadership, business and 
innovation, and recipient of the Teleos Most Admired Knowledge Leaders Award. 
He published an article in Ask Magazine, the NASA source for project 
management and engineering excellence, on “Challenging Complacency.” He 
argues that the first step in addressing complacency is to recognize how “deep 
rooted” and “intractable” it is.  
Denning (2006) offers common assumptions and behaviors that promote 
complacency. 
• Excessive reliance on prior success: The more often a particular 
routine achieves a successful outcome, the more likely people are 
to develop an unwarranted belief that success is assured. The 
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reality is that the opposite is true where random risks are involved; 
the probability of risk materializing increases over time. (p. 47) 
• Arrogance of experts: Disdain for laymen or for experts in other 
fields is a perennial tendency of the expert. The fact that the expert 
is right more often than the laymen can lead to the illusion of 
always being right. (p. 47) 
• Over-accentuation of the positive: Management is an action-
oriented activity. The can-do mind-set necessary for getting things 
done may discourage listening to nay-sayers and skeptics, even 
when their viewpoints have merit. Nevertheless, most high-value 
knowledge lies in negative narratives that reveal the pitfalls, 
difficulties, and obstacles that lie in the way of success. Since such 
narratives can be seen as a threat to management plans and 
objectives, fear of negative career consequences can hamper their 
dissemination. (p. 47) 
• Over-reliance on technology: Technical specialists have a tendency 
to believe in the infallibility of their technology, particularly in areas 
in which they have some knowledge and control. This belief can be 
a serious problem for computerized safety systems, which can 
generate a false sense of infallibility. (p. 47) 
• The Black Swan bias: People tend to discount the possibility of 
unprecedented risks. As all the swans they have seen are white, 
they assume black swans do not exist. A black-swan event is 
beyond the realm of normal expectations and tends to be 
discounted, even by experts. The difficulty of learning from black-
swan events is compounded by the fact that they rarely repeat. 
Learning from the discovery of one black swan that black swans 
are possible does not prepare anyone for, say, a platypus. (p. 47) 
• Groupthink: Groupthink occurs when people are deeply involved in 
a cohesive group whose striving for unanimity overrides a realistic 
appraisal of alternative courses of action. Large organizations often 
exhibit symptoms of groupthink, including illusions of invulnerability 
and a sense of superiority, collective rationalization, and 
stereotyping of outsiders as uninformed, ignoring contrary data, 
suppressing alternative viewpoints, and shielding leadership from 
dissent. (p. 47) 
Denning (2006) further outlines strategies for dealing with complacency 
and expands on the strengths and weaknesses of each strategy. The 
approaches include the following.  
• Changing the organizational structure 
• Force attention on often ignored important issues 
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• Give some autonomy to analysts, independence from 
managers to reduce fear in presenting findings  
• Establish pathways for professional dissent 
• Introduce structured approaches to managing risk 
• Create oases of safety through communities of practice 
• Upgrading the quality of discourse 
• Use analysis to get the best handle on known issues 
• Use narrative techniques to expand the range of issues to be 
addressed. Narrative techniques can help open up 
previously unimagined risks and reveal the nuances and 
interconnections of apparently unconnected risks. (p. 48) 
• Introduce pre-mortems; ask planners to imagine that their 
plan has been executed, and that it has failed, and to think 
about what might have caused the failure. Where the issues 
involve human behavior, role-playing and simulations can 
help overcome the problem of the time lag in learning from 
real-life experience in complex situations. Research shows 
that role-playing can yield more accurate predictions than 
expert forecasts. (p. 48) 
• Take active steps to enhance the flow of debate 
• Enhancing organizational value: Neither structural approaches nor 
steps to enhance dialogue are likely to be effective unless they are 
aligned with organizational values 
• Actions of top management are key 
• Values are usually established in situations in which leaders 
must deal with adversity 
• Establish and disseminate organizational values as a 
powerful way of inculcating a capability to deal with difficult 
issues throughout the organization 
• Getting ready for the unexpected: “Organizations need to prepare 
for unanticipated risks. After all known risks have been planned for 
and the right structures, discourses, and values put in place, they 
need to be prepared for issues that haven’t been anticipated.” (p. 
50) 
• Develop a capability to swarm, or decentralize decision 
making 
• Invest in redundancy. Build extra capacity and backup 
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• Transformational innovation: “Management often involves trying 
doing “more of the same” but doing it better, more quickly, and 
more economically. Innovation is about doing something completely 
different. In a sense, innovation is the opposite of management and 
requires dissimilar techniques” (p. 50)  
• Innovate for survivial when there are fundamental challenges 
in the environment 
• Adjust to the external environment 
• Do not rely on knowledge 
Figure 2 summarizes Denning’s (2006) recommended approaches for 
dealing with organizational complacency. 
 
Figure 2.  Steps to Fighting Organizational Complacency 
Finally, Denning (2006) concludes:  
In any large organization, the struggle against complacency is an 
unending battle. All avenues reviewed in this article need to be 
exploited, including structural approaches to enhancing the sharing 
of knowledge, steps to enhance the quality of the dialogue that 
takes place within those structures, strenuous efforts to establish 
and transmit appropriate organizational values, explicitly preparing 
for the unexpected, and creating a capability to undertake 
transformational innovation. Organizations cannot entirely eliminate 
risk or complacency, but serious and thoughtful efforts to counter 
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complacency can help bring dangers to light and reduce the 
likelihood of failure. (p. 51) 
4. Human Factors and Folk Models in Aviation 
Research on complacency in the aviation industry has also led to the 
conclusion that the general term should not be used due to the nature of folk 
science that led to its meaning. In Human Factors and Folk Models, Sidney 
Dekker and Erik Hollnagel (2004), Professors of Human Factors and Flight 
Safety at the School of Aviation at Lund University discuss the consequences of 
labeling concepts to describe a broad range of human behaviors. According to 
Dekker and Hollnagel (2004), human factors and folk science have led to many 
concepts that express the insights of the functional characteristics of the human 
mind that attempt to depict complex human behavior (Dekker & Hollnagel, 2004). 
For instance, one of the causational concepts often found in accident reports in 
automated industries is “automation complacency.”  
This propensity to develop concepts that involve human factors, they 
argue, prevents further investigation into the psychological mechanisms that 
might be responsible for the behavior because the concepts have become 
intuitively meaningful in the sense that everyone associates something with 
them. Therefore, they feel they understand what the concept is and do not 
investigate further. Furthermore, Dekker and Hollnagel (2004) purport that the 
dangerous consequences developing such concepts for human factors and the 
underlying complex human behavior, could lead to the syndrome of “The 
Emporer’s New Clothes.” People may no longer ask what these labels mean, lest 
others suspect they are not really initiated in the particulars of their business 
(Dekker & Hollnagel, 2004). 
Folk models substitute one big term for another instead of defining 
the big term by breaking it down into more little ones (in science we 
call this decomposition, or deconstruction)... Folk models are 
difficult to prove wrong, because they do not have a definition in 
terms of smaller components, that are observable in people’s real 
behavior. Folk models may seem glib; they offer popular, but not 
necessarily helpful, characterizations of difficult phenomena...Folk 
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models easily lead to over generalization...You are not bound to 
particular definitions, so you may interpret the concepts any way 
you like. (p. 80) 
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V. ANALYSIS 
Success requires enough optimism to provide hope and enough 
pessimism to prevent complacency. 
—David G. Myers, Exploring Psychology 
 
The previous chapter introduced an abundance of literature that was 
reviewed to provide a baseline understanding for this human factors-oriented 
approach into enhancing the resiliency of the homeland security enterprise. This 
chapter analyzes the literature in a manner such that conclusions can be drawn 
about the nature, technical definitions, and usage of complacency in context. 
A. FOLK PSYCHOLOGY DEBATE 
The usage of the term complacency falls within one of the major 
philosophical questions, the problem of other minds. How is it possible to know 
about the mental states of other people? The most commonly accepted answer 
to that is the theory of folk psychology, a psychological theory constituted by the 
platitudes about the mind ordinary people are inclined to endorse. It is the theory 
that gives ordinary mental state terms their meaning. According to folk 
psychology, terms, such as “complacency,” develop and evolve within cultures, 
are passed on as memes, and become accepted as “common wisdom.”  
In the previous chapter, a review of literature on folk science and folk 
psychology introduced a debate about the validity of this theory and draws into 
question whether terms used to describe mental states should be used at all. In 
short, from the verificationist perspective, some cognitive scientists and 
philosophers of the mind believe that the theory of folk psychology is a valid 
foundation for applying general terms to describe complex human behavior and 
mental states of mind. They validate it using both theory and observation, and 
name these terms “functional definitions.” This justification draws from empirical 
theories validating empirical science. On the other end of the spectrum, 
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eliminativists claim that it, and everything that results from it, should be stricken 
of any credibility in describing mental states. Simply stated, the theory of folk 
psychology is based on an empirical premise and any empirical premise is 
subject to be mistaken. Therefore, since folk psychology is such a seriously 
defective theory, it should also be concluded that the theoretical terms embedded 
in folk psychology do not really refer to anything. This debate continues to 
increase as new discoveries about the scientific understanding of the mind and 
brain emerge in psychology and the neurosciences.  
Although it is not the purpose of this thesis to debate the validity of folk 
psychology, it is important to highlight the controversy, should mental state terms 
be used at all? Pertaining to this thesis, this controversy begs the question as to 
whether “complacency” should be used in homeland security, and given so much 
credibility that homeland security professionals are constantly warning against it. 
At the very least, highlighting these controversial perspectives draws attention to 
the possibility that using “complacency” may not capture what the intended 
message is. This paradox supports the purpose of this research for further 
investigation as to its real meaning for the discipline, and explores its factors and 
attempts to define a concept that can be comprehended beyond blanket, 
arguably, vacant terminology. 
B. THE COMPLEX, HIGH-RELIABILITY HOMELAND SECURITY 
ENTERPRISE 
The previous chapter reviewed complexity theory and its application in 
organization science and management. In short, a complex system is one in 
which numerous independent elements continuously interact and spontaneously 
organize and reorganize themselves into more and more elaborate structures 
over time. They cannot be predicted and they do not observe the principle of 
reduction; they can naturally evolve to a state of self-organized criticality in which 
behavior lies at the border between order and disorder.  
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Analysis of this section reveals that the homeland security enterprise is 
undoubtedly a complex, HRO. A HRO is an organization that relies heavily on 
people to provide critical services or functions that strive to be error-free. 
Analysis also concludes that management, interaction among various 
components within the organization, and certain employee behaviors, are critical 
to the success of organizations that display such complexity. Therefore, as a 
complex HRO, the homeland security enterprise can optimize performance, and 
thus prevent complacency, by careful and deliberate improvements to 
organizational structure and management knowledge, and cultivating desirable 
reliability-oriented employee behaviors. 
C. TECHNICAL DEFINITIONS 
It is not uncommon for words to have a variety of definitions due to their 
usage in different contexts or applied to different scenarios. Nor it is uncommon 
that words have multiple, diverse definitions. However, when consulting 
dictionaries, such as the OED and Merriam-Webster, it is assumed that their 
definitions are somewhat authoritative. In the review of OED definitions for 
complacency, seven entries with a wide variety of insinuations were found. 
Common descriptors among the OED definitions are pleasure, satisfaction, 
contentment, consent and compliance (Oxford English Dictionary, 2010). 
Conversely, the MWOD (2011) provided a definition very different from the OED, 
“Self-satisfaction especially when accompanied by unawareness of actual 
dangers or deficiencies.” While some of these descriptors may capture the intent 
of using it in homeland security, some, like pleasure, do not initially make sense. 
For the purpose of this thesis, it is assumed that the MWOD definition is more 
applicable. 
The MWOD definition has applicable implications when applied to 
homeland security. Firstly, self-satisfaction indicates a smugness and 
contentment with an individual’s accomplishments. This definition could be 
relevant to an intelligence analyst who has successfully uncovered a terrorist plot 
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or incident commanders who conduct a well-managed response to an incident, 
and developed arrogance about their abilities that affects future performance. 
Secondly, unawareness indicates the inability of sensing problems if satisfied 
with the current state of affairs. In homeland security, which may be an 
intelligence analyst viewing injects of information as random and failing to 
recognize a pattern that may reveal a significant threat, or a key stakeholder not 
receiving relevant information about the threat environment.  
These definitions make it possible to draw several conclusions about the 
characteristics of complacency and can be applied to the homeland security 
discipline, but the manner in which homeland security professionals commonly 
use it, suggests that a more complex meaning of the concept exists. Therefore, 
further analysis of how, why, and when it is used by homeland security 
professionals can provide better insight into developing an applicable concept for 
the homeland security discipline. 
D. CONTENT ANALYSIS OF COMPLACENCY IN CONTEXT 
Although a dictionary is supposed to provide consensus on what a word 
means, sometimes the definitions are ill suited for providing the meaning, as was 
demonstrated by the OED’s definitions when applied to the homeland security 
discipline. In accordance with the thought of some lexicographers that 
dictionaries are not incontrovertible authority, the literature review of 
complacency in context was executed to best understand the term, as it is 
specifically applicable to the homeland security discipline.  
Utilizing content analysis for “complacency” in the homeland security 
context provides the methodology to quantify and analyze its usage, infer 
meanings and relationships, then make assumptions about the message within 
the texts, writers, audience, and even the culture and time of which these are a 
part. This approach was accomplished by coding, or breaking down the text into 
manageable categories on a variety of levels: word, word sense, phrase, 
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sentence, or theme, and then examining the results using conceptual analysis, a 
basic content analysis method. 
1. The Nature of Complacency 
Analysis of the way complacency is used in context concludes that 
complacency is an emotion inherent within a person and is exhibited through 
certain behaviors. Although inferred by many of the references, Loy (2004) 
distinctly stated that a “complacency gene” existed. This figurative use prompted 
the exploration of the psychological factors that can contribute to complacency 
that are discussed later.  
2. The Temporal Factor 
The most common attribute of complacency gleaned from the way it was 
used in context was a temporal factor. Almost all the statements reviewed 
referred to the prevalence of complacency as time passes from a significant 
event, most notably 9/11. For instance, former Secretary Chertoff stated, “[A]re 
we going to start seeing people cannibalize homeland security because we have 
not been attacked for six years; it doesn’t seem like a burning issue anymore” 
(Kimery, 2008). This statement among many others insinuated that vigilance will 
wane and complacency will set in as time moves forward from a major attack. 
3. The Geographic Proximity Factor 
Comments by Richard Clarke, former U.S. Counterterrorism Czar, implied 
that complacency also has a proximity factor. He stated, “It’s been 44 months 
since 9/11 and there is, in some locations around the country and in popular 
opinion, a growing sense of complacency” (Kimery, 2008). This reference to 
locations insinuates that varying levels of complacency depend on where an 
individual resides or works within the country, which suggests that people who 
work or reside in certain areas of the country not considered high-risk areas may 
have an increased likelihood of displaying complacency. 
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4. The Organizational and Responsibility Factor 
Similar to the proximity factor based on geography, the proximity factor is 
also applicable to where individuals fall within the homeland security enterprise, 
and differs based on their responsibilities. Homeland security professionals will 
exhibit varying degrees of complacency depending upon what their 
responsibilities are and where they fit in the enterprise. For instance, an 
intelligence analyst working in the National Capital Region at the National 
Operations Center with top-secret access to intelligence, real-time status updates 
of impending threats, and is responsible for briefing the Director of National 
Intelligence on the current threat environment, may be less likely to exhibit 
complacency than a chief of police in a small rural town far away from a high-risk, 
high-target area.  
5. Indicators of Complacency 
Analysis of complacency in the homeland security context revealed 
indicators of complacency. Recognizing and identifying the signs of complacency 
would be helpful to initiate efforts to combat it and possibly prevent problems to 
which it leads. According to Brinkerhoff (2001), complacency results out of habit 
and attitude when boredom sets in and attention is on other things. Research on 
complacency in the aviation industry also refers to boredom and inattention to 
tasks as a “symptoms” of complacency.  
6. Contributors to Complacency 
Content analysis of the literature also revealed that complacency is 
comprised of a category of contributors. The most commonly referenced 
contributor was successes of previous accomplishments. It was also stated that 
complacency is a result of self-satisfaction. Logically, this statement makes 
sense if a direct correlation exists that previous success results in self-
satisfaction, which is further supported by the definitions found in the dictionaries.  
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Additionally, Loy (2004) stated that complacency arises because people 
have the tendency to “default into a careless loss of focus.” This statement refers 
to a natural tendency further explored in the nature and psychological factors of 
complacency. Finally, Clarke (2008) had suggested that popular opinion affects 
complacency. Popular opinion is the beliefs or sentiments shared by most 
people, which insinuates people’s susceptibility to be influenced by others and is 
also supported by Denning’s reference to groupthink. 
7. Combating Complacency  
In addition to providing indicators and effects of complacency, ways to 
combat complacency were also deduced by the way complacency is used in 
context. Various statements suggest that being proactive and vigilant will oppose 
complacency, and to maintain vigilance, it is necessary to create a sense of 
urgency constantly.  
Other ways to combat complacency include, will, focus, working together, 
and preparedness. 
In regards to leadership, super dedication to preparedness by those in 
charge of the governments, institutions, and corporations of America, is 
imperative because if leadership demonstrates complacency, so will those who 
work for them. This concept is further supported by the analysis of management 
in complex organizations and the aviation industry’s proposal of organization 
induced complacency. 
Former counterterrorism czar Clarke offers a different perspective 
(Kimery, 2008). He reiterates that it is essential to be cognizant that this country’s 
responsibilities are great, wide, and continuous, and claims that complacency will 
persist if this nation minimizes its responsibilities to killing terrorists.  
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8. Effects of Complacency 
After analyzing the indicators of complacency, it is also important to 
analyze the effects of complacency to provide further insight as to why it is 
considered a threat and constantly warned against by homeland security 
professionals. Statements reviewed by former Secretary Chertoff indicates that 
complacency instills a reactionary attitude and can degrade success. Brinkerhoff 
(2001) claims complacency fosters the inertia of the status quo. All these effects 
are contradictory to the homeland security mission. Homeland security 
professionals are responsible for planning, training, and exercising in advance of 
disasters or terrorist attacks to promote the best response to an incident, not 
adopt a “wait-and-see attitude.” Some professionals are also responsible for 
creating innovative technologies, innovative problem solving, and developing 
innovative ways to analyze threats. This concept is the opposite of maintaining 
the status quo and the prevalence of these effects can be detrimental to the 
success of the homeland security enterprise in fulfilling its mission in a world that 
is constantly changing and evolving. To this end, Brinkerhoff (2001) boldly 
suggests that complacency will cause this nation to suffer another major attack. 
E. COMPLACENCY DEFERENCE IN DOCTRINE 
The paramount documents reviewed to assess the deference of 
complacency in homeland security were the 2010 QHSR and the NSHS that 
preceded the QHSR. These documents were selected because over the past 
decade, they have been the guiding doctrine that has steered activities in support 
the homeland security mission throughout the entire enterprise. Analysis of these 
documents revealed incongruent deference to complacency in the homeland 
security mission. 
The QHSR states that nine assumptions about the nation’s security 
environment must be considered when developing the five, core homeland 
security missions. Most of the assumptions are explicitly addressed within at 
least one of them. The last assumption listed states, “[W]e must guard against 
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the danger of complacency as memories of the 9/11 attacks and other major 
crises recede” (Department of Homeland Security, 2010, p. 8). The term 
“complacency” is highlighted in bold; however, it is not mentioned in the rest of 
the document or addressed in the five missions’ goals and objectives. Examples 
of other assumptions include the continuation of violent extremist groups, 
technological advances and cyber threats, and the threat of global climate 
change. Respectively, Mission 1: Preventing Terrorism and Enhancing Security 
addresses violent extremist groups, Mission 4: Safeguarding and Securing 
Cyberspace addresses enhancing cyber security; and Mission 5: Ensuring 
Resilience to Disasters addresses reducing vulnerabilities to the threats of global 
climate change.  
The NSHS that preceded the QHSR also referred to complacency as a 
challenge in homeland security and beyond stating, “We must guard against 
complacency and balance the sense of optimism that is fundamental to the 
American character with the sober recognition that despite our best efforts, future 
catastrophes—natural and man-made—will occur, and thus we must always 
remain a prepared Nation” (The White House, 2007, p. 6). Unlike the QHSR, the 
NSHS provides “responsibilities” instead of “missions” to delineate the strategy. 
Per the NSHS, the responsibilities of homeland security listed are preventing and 
disrupting terrorist attacks; protecting the American people, critical infrastructure, 
and key resources, and responding to, and recovering, from those incidents that 
do occur. Addressing complacency is not listed in any of these responsibilities. 
Also, in the NSHS, guidance is provided to help fulfill those responsibilities 
over the long term. “We will continue to strengthen the principles, systems, 
structures, and institutions that cut across the homeland security enterprise and 
support our activities to secure the Homeland” (The White House, 2007, p. 41). 
One such principle is fostering a culture or preparedness that includes, “As 
individual citizens we must guard against complacency, and as a society we 
must balance the sense of optimism that is fundamental to the American 
character with a sober recognition that future catastrophes will occur” (p. 41). 
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This restatement of the challenge statement is the only other mention of 
complacency. It does not provide an explanation of what complacency is, nor 
does it explain how to “guard against it.” 
In accordance with the structure and methodology of these documents, 
each of these assumptions should be addressed within a mission and 
responsibility. The incongruent deference could be for a variety of reasons. Three 
possible explanations are complacency is not important and does not require the 
attention that other security factors and challenges do, insufficient understanding 
of complacency exists to know how to address it appropriately within a mission 
and responsibility, or the missions and responsibilities are deficient of their 
overarching responsibility to encompass a broad and diverse range of risks and 
potential threats. For the purpose of this thesis, the second explanation is the 
most plausible and most appropriate. 
F. PSYCHOLOGICAL AND BIOLOGICAL FACTORS 
To a certain degree, homeland security professionals are limited by the 
mere fact that they are humans. Many different types of people within the 
Homeland Security enterprise handle a broad range of responsibilites, such as 
identifying warnings of an attack, assessing risk, and preparedness planning. It is 
common among all of them that they are human and subject to natural human 
inclinations. They have tendencies of optimism bias and self-efficacy; they are 
psychologically predisposed to being complacent. 
G. SITUATIONAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS 
The review of complexity theory in organizations and management, and 
content analysis of complacency in context, suggests situational and 
environmental factors of complacency, time and organizational construct. 
Analysis of Bellavita’s (2005) article on the issue attention cycle supports the 
temporal factor of complacency. The cyclical evolution of homeland security in 
public opinion and government action regarding attacks and threats presented 
five predictable stages that some issues follow: preproblem, alarmed discovery, 
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awareness of the costs of making significant progress, gradual decline of intense 
public (including public leaders) interest in the problem, and the post-problem 
stage (Bellavita, 2005). Most notably, analysis of stage four, “the public—
including public leaders—gradually loses interest in the problem,” supports that 
as time moves forward. the sense of urgency that Loy referenced diminishes. It 
can also be phrased, “as time move forward complacency increases,” (Loy, 
2004) just as Chertoff insinuated in his warning against “creeping complacency.” 
Another factor of complacency can be found in the environmental 
construct of complex organizations. West Point Cadets in “The Danger of 
Complacency” offered a practical example on organizational construct and 
management in complex organizations. “When a group of individuals work 
together for quite some time, the environment becomes comfortable. 
Unfortunately, a comfortable environment brings contentment, stagnation and 
group think. Before long, there is no striving for advancement or progress…This 
consistent leadership change keeps unit atmosphere continuously fresh, 
preventing complacency issues like GM had” (West Point Cadets, 2010). This 
literature suggests that organizational structure and management can affect the 
environment that fosters complacency, which is further supported by the analysis 
of the aviation industry’s research on complacency stating groupthink is a 
symptom of complacency. 
H. COMPLACENCY IN AVIATION: APPLICATIONS FOR HOMELAND 
SECURITY 
Lessons are to be learned from the extensive research the aviation 
industry has conducted on complacency. First and foremost, the mere fact that it 
has identified the problem, and over the last few decades, applied effort to 
understand and address it, exemplifies the credibility it is given in the discipline. 
Additionally, the fact that the research has led to demonstrable improvements in 
organizational design, management development and training programs directly 
resulting in less accidents, validates that addressing the problem can achieve 
positive results and may be worth the investment.  
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To achieve the accomplishments of the research, the aviation industry first 
developed a well-defined, well-understood concept of complacency. However, 
the research did not stop there. It has developed a full concept that has 
categories, symptoms, and suggested ways to challenge it. Although its research 
findings are specific to the aviation industry, some general findings are offered 
that can applicable to other disciplines.  
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VI. CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter provides the conclusions the author has drawn in her quest 
to answer research questions that inspired this thesis by providing her findings 
and expand on each to support her conclusions. Furthermore, she describes how 
the journey to answer these questions revealed a variety of lenses through which 
to view complacency in homeland security. Each of these lenses provides a 
plethora of opportunities for future research of this topic, which is provided at the 
closing of the chapter. 
A. THE EXCEPTION, NOT THE RULE 
In the world of homeland security, it is common practice that as threats are 
identified, counter-measures are developed to mitigate that threat. One threat 
often mentioned, complacency, seems to be the exception. Complacency, as a 
threat to homeland security, is given ample deference by leadership in the 
homeland security community. It is often referred to as a dangerous threat in 
speeches by homeland security officials and is embedded in homeland security 
doctrine. However, no research can be currently found that articulates the threat 
in a manner that can lead to developing counter-measures to mitigate it.  
The original intention of this thesis was to fill this void of research and 
examine the concept of complacency in the context of homeland security. The 
author’s hypothesis was that thorough examination would lead to a clear 
definition of the threat. Once the threat was defined, the definition would provide 
insight from which actionable counter-measures could be developed to mitigate 
it.  
The root cause analysis method of this thesis was inspired by the proven 
success demonstrated by the research conducted on complacency in the 
aviation industry. The tangible success of research in the aviation industry has 
resulted in a reduced number of accidents. Research shows a 20/80 ratio of 
aviation accidents attributed to human errors induced by complacency; a 
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machine caused 20 percent of accidents, whereas some human element caused 
80 percent (Grey Owl Aviation Consultants, 2004). This staggering statistic 
warranted scholarly investigation by social scientists as to what complacency in 
aviation is. Their deductive hypothesis is that if an error is part of a chain of 
events that led to an accident, diffusing the judgment that led to the error can 
prevent the accident. This concept is a human factors approach to dealing with a 
problem, where the focus is on the human rather than external causes. Likewise, 
the research for this thesis required addressing the problem from a human 
factors perspective. 
1. A Human Factors Approach 
A human factors approach centers focus on the people within the 
homeland security enterprise, as the people are afflicted with complacency. The 
human factors perspective makes it possible to apply what is known about 
people’s abilities, characteristics, and limitations to the equipment they use, 
environment they function in and jobs they perform. This lens focuses on tools 
from psychology and behavior. It requires a paradigm shift from focusing on 
preparing for external threats from enemies that wish to harm this nation and 
building capabilities to respond to disasters to looking internally at the behaviors, 
attitudes, and states of mind of people within homeland security organizations.  
Human factors are physical, cognitive, or social properties that affect the 
attitude, state of mind, and behavior of humans. These properties can influence 
the function of human-environment equilibriums and the overall performance of 
systems and organizations. Human factors science involves the study of all ways 
humans relate to the world around them, with the aim of improving operational 
performance. This science has become widely used across many disciplines 
since its origin during World War II when the military employed it in designing 
aircrafts, viewing the aircraft and the pilot as a single organism. While the initial 
focus of human factors science was on human interaction with technology, the 
science has expanded to encompass sets of human-specific properties, which 
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may interact in a critical or dangerous manner with the natural environment and 
within organizations.  
The human factors approach emphasizes addressing this problem with 
respect to the human-environment equilibrium of the organization. Therefore, it is 
also necessary to understand the environment. Research of the homeland 
security enterprise revealed that it is a complex organization. Therefore, it is also 
prudent to address this problem through the lens of complexity.  
2. Complexity 
A complex system is one in which numerous independent elements 
continuously interact and spontaneously organize and reorganize themselves 
into more elaborate structures over time. Complexity theory views organizations 
as analogous to the creative disorder in the universe and contends that common 
management practices should not apply to complex organizations. Common 
practices of management contend it is their responsibility to decide where an 
organization is going, enunciate the mission, determine the strategy, and 
eliminate deviation. Stability is viewed as the ultimate safeguard against anxiety, 
which could otherwise be overwhelming. These managerial tendencies may 
seem to make sense, but are actually counter-productive from the complexity 
theory perspective.  
In a typical organization, a chief executive officer supervises a 
management team with a vision and a strategy supported by a common culture. 
The organization should stick to its core competencies, build on its strengths, 
adapt to the market environment, and keep its eyes focused on the bottom line 
(Rosenhead, 2001). Complexity theorists contend that in a complex environment, 
making decisions toward this end is a dangerous delusion. Therefore, much 
management orthodoxy needs to be turned on its head, such as analysis loses 
its primacy, contingency (cause and effect) loses its meaning, long-term planning 
becomes impossible, visions become illusions, consensus, and strong cultures 
becomes dangerous. To this end, it is essential to be cognizant of the complex 
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nature of the homeland security enterprise when applying the knowledge gained 
of complacency.  
B. IS COMPLACENCY A THREAT TO HOMELAND SECURITY?  
The short answer is, yes, people believe it is. It is apparent that the 
manner in which “complacency” is used proverbially, people have a general 
consensus that complacency is considered a threat. For example, in February 
2008, former Secretary Michael Chertoff attended a roundtable sponsored by 
Christian Science Monitor. This roundtable was summarized and presented as 
an article in HS Today. The author states that during this roundtable Chertoff 
warned against “creeping complacency” over preparedness for all catastrophes 
(Kimery, 2008). “Complacency is the greatest enemy that we have and the 
greatest challenge we have.” Furthermore, Chertoff stated:  
We’ve got a lot more to do … The biggest [question] my successor 
will face is, ‘Does the public and does Congress have the will to 
stick to the program, or are we going to start seeing people 
cannibalize homeland security because we have not been attacked 
for six years; it doesn’t seem like a burning issue anymore. There’s 
a lot of other things we could spend money on, and so, therefore, 
we will start to allow the progress to be degraded. (Kimery, 2008) 
In the same article, the author references how, in May 2005, former U.S. 
counterterrorism czar Richard Clarke told a homeland security conference in 
Washington, DC that he feared both the government and public were slipping 
into a false sense of complacency toward security despite the probability the 
United States faces another wave of attacks (Kimery, 2008). 
It’s been 44 months since 9/11 and there is, in some locations 
around the country and in popular opinion, a growing sense of 
complacency,” Clarke said, emphasizing that “we can’t get back to 
normal. We can never get back to normal.  
Furthermore, Clarke continues to state: 
Someday [terrorists] will come back; there will be a second 
wave…And if we are complacent—if we think because we’ve 
[crossed] out all the names on our chart, if we think that we don’t 
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have to reduce our vulnerabilities and improve our security here at 
home—we will suffer another major attack. (Kimery, 2008) 
Finally, this article on complacency includes a bold statement from 
Chertoff that provides insight into a culture that breeds complacency. 
One thing I am sick and tired of is an approach to everything we do, 
which is, ‘Let’s not pay attention until the disaster happens. Then 
we will have a hearing. We will punish somebody, and then we will 
spend a lot of money making up for what happened afterwards. 
(Kimery, 2008) 
During remarks made to the National Cargo Security Council, James Loy 
(2004), former Deputy Secretary of the DHS, spoke of a “complacency gene” that 
leads everyone to have the “tendency to default into a careless loss of focus.” 
We now have another year’s worth of attacks—in Madrid, Istanbul, 
Baghdad, and in Saudi Arabia—that indicate we must continue to 
fight that complacency and maintain an unprecedented level of 
vigilance in everything we do…our emotions must not be dulled by 
the passage of time. (Loy, 2004)  
In an effort to provide support for maintaining federal funding for the 
Transit Security Grant Program in New York, Judith Miller (2010), an author and 
commentator of Fox News, contributing editor of “City Magazine” of the 
Manhattan Institute, and Pulitzer prize-winning investigative reporter for the New 
York Times, argues that complacency is “our greatest threat.”  She opines, 
“Vigorous counterterrorism effort requires consistent support. That’s tough almost 
nine years after 9/11 without another major successful attack on American soil. 
Success breeds complacency —our greatest threat” (Miller, 2010).  This usage of 
complacency is intended to strengthen her persuasive argument.  
In “The Relationship of Warning and Response in Homeland Security,” 
John Brinkerhoff (2001), senior editor of the Journal of Homeland Security draws 
attention to the direct correlation between complacency and the ability for 
homeland security officials to commit to swift and effective responses to warnings 
that are out there about impending attacks on the United States.  He contends 
that it is an American tradition to be “surprised” by major events such as 9/11, but 
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asserts that Americans would not be surprised at all if it were not for 
complacency and other human errs.  
On May 5, 2009, during a media briefing, Secretary Napolitano stated her 
cautious optimism about the how the knowledge the Center for Disease Control 
was giving them a better understanding of the H1N1 virus and the guidance on 
school closings had changed. She stated: 
This is not a time for complacency or the belief that we can simply 
declare victory over H1N1 and move on…This is why we are 
preparing now for what may come in the future. We are not in a 
place where we can simply sit back and see what happens. We 
have to lean forward. And we have to remain prepared because 
nature has a way of being little unpredictable and throwing us a 
curveball from time to time.” (Department of Homeland Security, 
2009) 
In addition to the way complacency is used in context by homeland 
security officials, the manner it is used in homeland security doctrine also 
suggests that it is used proverbially. The paramount documents reviewed to 
assess the deference of complacency in homeland security were the 2010 QHSR 
and the NSHS that preceded the QHSR. These documents were selected 
because over the past decade, they have been the guiding doctrine that has 
steered activities in support of the homeland security mission throughout the 
entire enterprise. Analysis of these documents revealed incongruent deference to 
complacency in the homeland security mission. 
Within the QHSR there are nine assumptions about the nation’s security 
environment that must be considered when developing the five, core homeland 
security missions. All but one of the assumptions are explicitly addressed within 
missions. The last assumption listed states, “[W]e must guard against the danger 
of complacency as memories of the 9/11 attacks and other major crises recede” 
(Department of Homeland Security, 2010, p. 8). The term “complacency” is 
highlighted in bold; however, it is not referred to in the rest of the document much 
less addressed in the five missions’ goals and objectives. Examples of other 
assumptions include the continuation of violent extremist groups, technological 
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advances and cyber threats, and the threat of global climate change. 
Respectively, Mission 1: Preventing Terrorism and Enhancing Security 
addresses violent extremist groups, Mission 4: Safeguarding and Securing 
Cyberspace addresses enhancing cyber security, and Mission 5: Ensuring 
Resilience to Disasters addresses reducing vulnerabilities to the threats of global 
climate change.  
The NSHS also referred to complacency as a challenge in homeland 
security. “We must guard against complacency and balance the sense of 
optimism that is fundamental to the American character with the sober 
recognition that despite our best efforts, future catastrophes—natural and man-
made—will occur, and thus we must always remain a prepared Nation” (The 
White House, 2007, p. 6). The NSHS provides “responsibilities” instead of 
“missions” as within the QHSR to delineate the strategy. Per the NSHS, the 
responsibilities of homeland security listed are preventing and disrupting terrorist 
attacks, protecting the American people, critical infrastructure, and key 
resources, and responding to and recovering from those incidents that do occur. 
Similarly to the QHSR, complacency is not listed in any of these responsibilities. 
Additionally, NSHS guidance is provided to help fulfill those 
responsibilities over the long term. “We will continue to strengthen the principles, 
systems, structures, and institutions that cut across the homeland security 
enterprise and support our activities to secure the Homeland” (The White House, 
2007, p. 41). One such principle is fostering a culture or preparedness, which 
includes, “As individual citizens we must guard against complacency, and as a 
society we must balance the sense of optimism that is fundamental to the 
American character with a sober recognition that future catastrophes will occur” 
(p. 41). This restatement of the challenge statement is the only other mention of 
complacency. In line with the structure and methodology of these documents, 
each assumption should be addressed within a mission and responsibility.  
However, the NSHS fails to provide an explanation of what complacency is, and 
does not explain how to “guard against it.”  
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This acceptance of complacency as a threat, however, seems to be 
without critical examination. The omission of how to address complacency, while 
highlighting it as a threat in homeland security doctrine, epitomizes this 
acceptance. Why is complacency an exception? Why is complacency blanketly 
accepted as a threat, but precluded from further research and investigation as 
other threats are? These questions compelled the author to critically examine 
why Americans accept complacency as a threat as true, which led her to look at 
complacency through the lens of folk psychology and folk models. 
1. Folk Psychology and Folk Models 
The theory of folk psychology is a psychological theory constituted by the 
platitudes about the mind that ordinary people are inclined to endorse. It is the 
theory that mental state terms develop and evolve within cultures, are passed on 
as memes, and become accepted as common wisdom. However, much caution 
about applying this theory is warranted.  
In “Human Factors and Folk Models,” Sidney Dekker and Erik Hollnagel 
(2004), Professors of Human Factors and Flight Safety at the School of Aviation 
at Lund University, discuss the consequences of labeling concepts to describe a 
broad range of human behaviors. According to Dekker and Hollnagel (2004), 
human factors and folk science have led to many concepts that express the 
insights of the functional characteristics of the human mind, which attempt to 
depict complex human behavior. This propensity to develop concepts that involve 
human factors, they argue, prevents further investigation into the psychological 
mechanisms that might be responsible for the behavior because the concepts 
have become intuitively meaningful in the sense that everyone associates 
something with them. Therefore, they feel they understand what the concept is 
and do not investigate further.  
Folk models substitute one big term for another instead of defining 
the big term by breaking it down into more little ones (in science we 
call this decomposition, or deconstruction)... Folk models are 
difficult to prove wrong, because they do not have a definition in 
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terms of smaller components, that are observable in people’s real 
behavior. Folk models may seem glib; they offer popular, but not 
necessarily helpful, characterizations of difficult phenomena...Folk 
models easily lead to over generalization...You are not bound to 
particular definitions, so you may interpret the concepts any way 
you like. (p. 80) 
In addition to the caution that Dekker and Hollnagel (2004) give about 
using folk models, controversy exists regarding the validity of even using mental 
state terms at all. An enduring debate is ongoing among philosophers regarding 
an individual’s ability to know the mental states of others. Therefore, they 
contend that mental state terms should never be used. The other side of the 
argument is that folk psychology is a valid foundation for applying general terms 
to describe complex human behavior and mental states of mind. 
While it is not the purpose of this thesis to debate the validity of folk 
psychology and folk models, it is important to highlight the cautions and 
controversy. At the very least, highlighting these controversial perspectives 
draws attention to the possibility that using “complacency” may not capture what 
the intended message is when it is given so much credibility that homeland 
security professionals are constantly warning against it and highlighting it in 
doctrine. It can be glossed over like many other human factors concepts through 
the folk model process. Thus, it becomes a proverbial threat void of true 
meaning. 
C. WHAT IS COMPLACENCY FOR THE HOMELAND SECURITY 
DISCIPLINE AND WHAT CAN WE DO ABOUT IT? 
The lens of folk psychology and folk models introduces two perspectives, 
from which to define complacency, folk models are valid, folk models are not 
valid. From the perspective that folk models and folk psychology is valid, it is 
crucial to accept that complacency obtains its meaning by how it is used and 
passed along through cultures. This perspective requires that a definition of 
complacency in homeland security is being developed as time moves forward in 
the context with which it is used. Through this lens, it may not be possible to 
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articulate a definition of the concept of complacency in homeland security except 
for a snapshot in time. It could be a concept that is evolving and developing on its 
own, developing in the context of which it is used. The way complacency is 
currently used in context may be a meme that will be passed on for future 
generations. Could this path lead to synonymy between “complacency: and 
“threat” in reference to homeland security? This perspective implies that 
Americans are active participants in creating its meaning. Are they are making it 
a threat, rather than it already being a threat? 
Through the lens of accepting folk models and folk psychology as not true, 
the mental state term must be decomposed into observable behavior. To avoid 
the pitfall of mental state terms that Derrek and Hollnagel (2004) present, 
(substituting one big term for another instead of defining the big term by breaking 
it down into more little ones observable in people’s real behavior), complacency 
must be viewed from a variety of perspectives that may lead to multiple 
definitions, as was so in the aviation industry. 
Both these lenses require analysis of how complacency is used in context. 
This research provides an analysis of how the term is used in the aforementioned 
examples. The analysis revealed many factors, indicators, and effects of 
complacency, each of which is prime for future research. Factors include 
psychological disposition, time, and proximity. Indicators include boredom and 
self-satisfaction. Effects include a reactionary attitude. 
For instance, the term’s use in context indicates that complacency is an 
emotion inherent within a person and is exhibited through certain behaviors. 
Although inferred by many of the references, it was distinctly stated by Loy 
(2004) that a “complacency gene” existed. This figurative use prompted the 
exploration of the psychological and biological factors that can contribute to 
complacency.  
Gleaned from the way it was used in context, the most common attribute 
of complacency was a temporal factor. Nearly all the statements reviewed 
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referred to the prevalence of complacency as time passes from a significant 
event, most notably 9/11. An example was when former Secretary Chertoff 
stated, “[A]re we going to start seeing people cannibalize homeland security 
because we have not been attacked for six years; it doesn’t seem like a burning 
issue anymore” (Kimery, 2008).  
Complacency also has a proximity factor as indicated by comments from 
Richard Clarke, former U.S. counterterrorism czar.  He stated, “It’s been 44 
months since 9/11 and there is, in some locations around the country and in 
popular opinion, a growing sense of complacency” (Kimery, 2008). This 
reference to locations insinuates varying levels of complacency are dependent 
on where an individual resides or works within the country. This concept 
insinuates that people who work or reside in certain areas of the country not in 
proximity of high-risk areas may have an increased likelihood of displaying 
complacency. 
Similar to the proximity factor based on geography, the proximity factor is 
also applicable to where individuals fall within the homeland security enterprise 
and differs based on their responsibilities. Homeland security professionals may 
exhibit varying degrees of complacency depending upon what their 
responsibilities are and where they fit in the enterprise. For instance, an 
intelligence analyst working in the National Capital Region at the National 
Operations Center with top-secret access to intelligence, real-time status updates 
of impending threats and is responsible for briefing the Director of National 
Intelligence on the current threat environment may be less likely to exhibit 
complacency than a chief of police in a small rural town far away from a high-risk, 
high-target area.  
Content analysis of the literature also revealed a category of indicators of 
complacency. The most commonly referenced contributor was successes of 
previous accomplishments. It was also stated that complacency is a result of self-
satisfaction. Additionally, James Loy (2004) stated that complacency arises 
because people have the tendency to “default into a careless loss of focus.” This 
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statement refers to a natural tendency further explored in the nature and 
psychological factors of complacency. Finally, Clarke had suggested that popular 
opinion affects complacency (Kimery, 2008). Popular opinion is the beliefs or 
sentiments shared by most people, who insinuates people’s susceptibility to be 
influenced by others and is also supported by Denning’s reference to groupthink. 
Effects of complacency may also contribute to a definition. Statements 
reviewed by former Secretary Chertoff indicates that complacency instills a 
reactionary attitude and can degrade success (Kimery, 2008). Brinkerhoff (2001) 
claims complacency fosters the inertia of the status quo. All these effects are 
contradictory to the homeland security mission. Homeland security professionals 
are responsible for planning, training, and exercising in advance of disasters or 
terrorist attacks to promote the best response to an incident, not adopt a “wait-
and-see attitude.” Some professionals are also responsible for creating 
innovative technologies, innovative problem solving, and developing innovative 
ways to analyze threats. This approach is the opposite of maintaining the status 
quo, and the prevalence of these effects can be detrimental to the success of the 
homeland security enterprise in fulfilling its mission in a world that is constantly 
changing and evolving. To this end, Brinkerhoff boldly suggests that 
complacency will cause this nation to suffer another major attack. 
While a concise definition could not be gleaned from the way complacency 
is used in context, the factors, indicators, and effects may lead to future research 
to develop multiple definitions as the aviation industry has developed. 
D. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
In conclusion, the author originally set out to apply basic problem-solving 
strategies to address a threat to homeland security…complacency, through the 
lens of human factors and complexity. Her research concludes that the general 
manner in which complacency is commonly used today indicates it is more of a 
proverbial threat than an actionable threat. As a proverbial threat, it can be 
argued that it should not be mentioned at all. However, defining the concept into 
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actionable, observable behavior may lead to actionable, observable measures to 
mitigate it.  
This thesis was the first research to examine the threat critically. 
Throughout this journey, the research uncovered a broader range of lenses from 
which to view complacency in the homeland security enterprise. Each lens 
further unveiled limitless, albeit tangential, opportunities for research in a wide 
variety of disciplines. The lenses range the spectrum from philosophy, biological 
sciences, social sciences, and applied sciences. This broad range allowed the 
surface to be scratched in each area, and further revealed extensive opportunity 
for future research.  
Future research requires cognizance of human factors and the complexity 
of the homeland security enterprise. The human factors lens focuses on the 
people that comprise the homeland security enterprise; making it possible to 
apply what is known about their abilities, characteristics, and limitations to the 
jobs they perform. This lens forces this nation to look at the people of the 
enterprise that affect its success. Additionally, viewing the homeland security 
enterprise as a complex, self-adaptive system highlights more research 
opportunities including how the governmental organizations can optimize 
efficiency by approaching organizational and management problems. One of the 
key findings of the research conducted in the aviation industry was that changes 
to organizational construct, management, and training programs impacted the 
prevalence of complacency. Applying this view to organizations and 
management in the government agencies of the homeland security enterprise 
would be a drastic change from the current status quo. However, it may elucidate 
new and improved ways to fulfill its mission.  
Viewing complacency through the folk science and folk psychology lens 
incites further general exploration into the debate of using mental state terms. 
Future research questions may include is a mental state term worthy of being 
considered a threat to homeland security? Additionally, further research can be 
conducted on how the concept of complacency is passed on as a meme within 
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the homeland security culture. Will it ever be possible to articulate a meaning for 
it? 
Finally, anyone interested in taking this research further and attempt to 
define the concept of complacency to answer these original research questions 
may further explore how “complacency” continues to be used in context. Each of 
the factors, indicators, and effects examined in this thesis can be explored more 
thoroughly. Additionally, analysis of how the use of the term has evolved, or 
maintained consistent, may also aid in articulating a definition.  
Critical examination of the threat of complacency is in its infancy stages. 
Future research can be explored through the many lenses identified in this 
thesis. It is uncertain whether future research will find that complacency is a 
threat, is not a threat, or result in a definition, or definitions, that articulate the 
threat, and counter-measures are developed to mitigate it. However, it is certain 
that it will lead to more lenses from which it can be viewed.  
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